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ABSTRACT:
Disaster vulnerability is a serious issue in developing countries where globalization,
development patterns, poverty and environmental degradation are placing more people at risk to
natural disasters. Recent appeals for greater multi-sectoral collaboration to tackle complex disaster
situations have raised the need for private sector participation in disaster management. The private
sector is already beginning to play more engaged roles in disaster response and recovery on a
voluntary basis, yet limited understanding currently exists about their activities in this area. Given
the problem of rising vulnerability to natural disasters and the emergence of increased private sector
involvement in disaster activities, this thesis seeks to understand: 1) why firms become involved in
disaster response and recovery on voluntary (i.e. philanthropic) terms; and 2) the nature and
implementation of corporate initiatives in this context.
To illustrate private sector motivations and roles in the disaster response and recovery, the
study focused on corporate responses to the Gujarat Earthquake in India in 2001. The research was
informed by concepts of corporate social responsibility (CSR). The analysis produced three sets of
findings, based on in-depth interviews with national and multinational companies which responded
to the Gujarat Earthquake. The research indicates that corporations are motivated to become
involved in disaster response and recovery based on six organizational factors: social values, disaster
sensitivity, internal organization, external pressures, and perceived benefits. These dimensions
expand our prior understanding of corporate motivations which focuses primarily on organizational
benefits and stakeholder expectations, and introduces the critical influences of social values,
commitment to philanthropy, and resource availability and relevancy.
The research also identifies differences in the nature of response versus recovery
initiatives. In terms of disaster response, companies pursued unilateral disaster response
activities, often implementing large-scale, top-down relief and infrastructure-oriented initiatives.
Corporations coordinate with the government and leverage their internal resources for response,
but do not emphasize community participation in their approach. In contrast, recovery initiatives
were focused on participatory, community-oriented reconstruction and livelihood-generating
programs. Recovery efforts tended to be structured as formal, collaborative partnerships with
NGOs, wherein both parties play complementary roles in implementation. The analysis further
reveals the differences between national and multinational corporate efforts in disaster response
and recovery.
Contributing to practice, the findings help guide the formation of policies that enable and
enhance private sector participation in disasters in order to achieve more effective operations that
alleviate suffering and reduce vulnerability. Theoretically, the thesis reveals the extent to which
existing notions of corporate social responsibility account for corporate activity in disaster
response and recovery and presents an expanded framework for interpreting organizational
behavior in this context.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
On January 26, 2001, a major earthquake rocked the far reaches of the state of Gujarat in
India. It left over 20,000 people dead and caused massive destruction of infrastructure, housing and
livelihoods. Near the epicenter, in the city of Bhuj, over 90% of the structures collapsed from the
impact of the quake, highlighting how inappropriate development patterns can turn natural events
into devastating calamities. As one of the worst natural disasters in recent Indian history, the
magnitude of the social and economic impacts of the Gujarat Earthquake illustrates the growing
vulnerability to disasters in disaster-prone developing countries and the potential development crisis
it poses for vulnerable communities. Responses to this earthquake also highlight ways in which the
private sector can play a more engaged role in addressing disaster vulnerability.
The forces of globalization, unplanned urbanization, poverty and environmental degradation
are placing more people at risk to natural disaster in developing countries. Rising disaster
vulnerability is occurring amid a global trend of increasing frequency and intensity of natural
disasters, with exponential growth taking place in the last decade. The vulnerability situation is an
alarming one since disasters directly threaten development, undermining social and economic
advancements and disrupting education, infrastructure and health services. Furthermore, disasters
disproportionately impact the poor, yielding greater relative losses in developing countries.
To address growing vulnerability in developing countries, many states and humanitarian
organizations have begun to call for greater multi-sectoral collaboration in disaster initiatives. The
state has tended to be the dominant actor in disaster management, although international and local
humanitarian NGOs have a long history of activity in this arena. In response, it appears that
corporations are increasing their voluntary (i.e. non-commercial or philanthropic) involvement in
disaster management. This voluntary participation suggests some private sector actors may be
reinterpreting their relationship with society and local community, in line with conceptions of
corporate social responsibility and recent demands for greater corporate accountability that have
arisen from perceptions of globalization and unfettered corporate power. Since scholars and
practitioners are heralding multi-sectoral involvement in disaster management as a more viable
model for intervention, it is important to gain an understanding of the roles and rationales for
private sector involvement in disaster management.
A natural disaster is defined as an occurrence triggered by a natural hazard (e.g. an
earthquake, cyclone, or hurricane) that disrupts normal conditions and causes a level of suffering
that exceeds the capacity of adjustment for the affected community (WHO/EIA 2002). The impact
of a natural disaster depends on the level of vulnerability of a community (Twigg 2001). Many man-
made factors, such as housing, infrastructure, and planning, can influence the degree to which to
community is vulnerable to a natural disaster. To tackle vulnerability to natural disasters in
developing countries, a deservedly strong emphasis in policy and research has been placed on
mitigation and disaster reduction approaches since they are less costly than post-disaster efforts and
can avert substantial social, economic and human losses. Although mitigation is important, this
research focuses on the role of corporations in disaster response and recoveg. The primary reason for
limiting the scope to this area is the fact that the thrust of existing private sector efforts have been
response and recovery interventions. Though corporations have been criticized for their response
focus, policymakers also continue to concentrate resources in this area (Twigg 2001). Plus, there is
an opportunity to link recovery activities to mitigation through progressive policies and programs.
Nationally-owned companies in developing countries often have a vested interest in supporting
national development, a concern that can be channeled through hazard-mitigating rehabilitation
programs. Another reason to focus on the area of response and recovery is the fact that even the
most aggressive mitigation strategies will not eliminate the need for effective preparedness, response
and recovery to deal with the impact of disasters when they do occur (Mileti 1999).
The private sector is emerging as an actor in disaster response and recovery and may prove
instrumental in addressing rising vulnerability in developing countries. Given the gap in our
knowledge about the roles corporations are playing in disaster situations and the need to consider
other aspects of the disaster management cycle beyond mitigation, this research addresses two
questions: 1) Why do firms participate in response and recovery to natural disasters on voluntary (i.e.
philanthropic) terms; and 2) What is the nature and implementation of corporate initiatives in
disaster response and recovery? Understanding corporate motivations and roles in disasters can
enable the formulation of policies and programs that support and nurture a constructive role for
corporations in disaster response and recovery in developing countries, in order to achieve more
collaborative and effective disaster operations. Additionally, the findings from this thesis should help
direct the operation of the Disaster Resource Network (DRN), a newly formed NGO whose
mission is to mobilize private sector resources -personnel, supplies and technology- for disaster
management.
The research was informed by concepts of corporate social responsibility (CSR), which, in
general, seek to explain business relations with society. This body of scholarship was selected
because it provides an analytical basis for understanding organizational practices in corporate
disaster response and recovery. Although a multidimensional theory, elements of CSR such as
stakeholder analysis (Carroll 1999), commitment to community (Woodward 2001; Waddock 2002),
organizational benefits behind social behavior (Hopkins 2003), and ethical obligations to use
business resources in ways that have a positive impact on society (Moir 2001) are useful for
understanding corporate disaster initiatives. The findings of other studies that focus on private
sector involvement in disasters also serve as a critical guide for comparison (e.g. Twigg 2002; Bhatt
2002). From a theoretical standpoint, this thesis considers the extent to which existing notions of
corporate social responsibility account for corporate activity in disaster response and recovery and
presents an expanded framework for interpreting organizational behavior in this context.
To answer the central research questions posed in this thesis, a qualitative evaluation of
corporate responses to the Gujarat Earthquake in India was carried out through in-person, semi-
structured interviews with twelve companies (six national and six multinational companies), all of
which played a significant role in response and/or recovery following the Gujarat Earthquake. The
interviewees were senior managers in business operations, corporate communications, and
community development who were directly involved with their company's disaster initiatives in
Gujarat. The interviews were transcribed and then analyzed using a grounded theory approach. This
analysis allowed for new dynamics to emerge beyond those that the theoretical framework proposes.
The Gujarat Earthquake demonstrates disaster vulnerability in a large, disaster-prone
developing country with characteristics that may be likened to other contexts. In particular, the
magnitude of destruction, the considerable corporate response, the developing country setting, the
existence of disaster research institutes, and the linkages to the global economy in the state of
Gujarat were factors supporting the choice of this disaster/location for a case study. Since the
earthquake occurred three years prior to the research, this distance allowed for a perspective on the
completion and success of corporate disaster initiatives while being recent enough to support
accurate recollections.
The analysis of national and multinational responses to the Gujarat earthquake revealed a
number of key findings on corporate motivations and roles in disaster response and recovery. In
general, natural disasters emerged as an important arena for corporate action. First, it appears that
there are six factors that motivate corporations to participate in disaster response and recovery
activities: social values, disaster sensitivity, internal organization, external pressures, and perceived
benefits. In terms of motivations, the desire to fill needs/gaps in the system and the importance of
internal resources and external expectations were unique influences on corporate involvement in this
arena. Second, the assessment of roles that corporations are pursuing revealed differences in the
nature of implementation activities in the response versus recovery phases. This investigation
suggests that corporations are playing an engaged role in disaster response, with a focus on relief
activities and infrastructure. It appears that they are relying on a unilateral, top-down approach,
while cooperating with the government and leveraging their vast internal resources for response
activities. The efforts of national companies appear more comparable to those of state or NGO
humanitarian actors, pursuing large-scale, comprehensive relief operations. In contrast, the analysis
of corporate recovey efforts indicates that these initiatives tend to be community-level reconstruction
and livelihood-generating programs. National and multinational companies uniformly appear to be
implementing recovery programs through formal, collaborative partnerships with NGOs, wherein
parties play complementary roles and incorporate community participation. Finally, unlike their
national counterparts, a number of national companies decided to formalize their response or
recovery efforts into long-term programs or replicable models following the earthquake, with the
intention of making their future involvement in disasters less ad-hoc and more strategic.
Since a multi-sectoral approach to disaster management has emerged as the new paradigm for
addressing increased vulnerability, it is important to understand the factors that promote
corporations as sustained actors in this field. Although corporate involvement in disaster
management has the potential to provide strategic resources and assets to increasingly complex
disaster situations, private sector roles in disasters remain an understudied topic. Therefore, this
research is not only important for determining the viability of corporations as social actors in
disasters, but also for elucidating the conditions and factors that weigh into corporate participation
in disasters. The findings can inform the formation of policies that enable and enhance private
sector participation in disasters in order to achieve more effective operations that alleviate suffering
and reduce vulnerability. In particular, they can help guide the policies of national/local
governments and intermediate organizations (i.e. business-member NGOs) dedicated to disasters in
the following areas: bridging the learning barrier to corporate involvement, capitalizing on corporate
core competencies, differentiating approaches for response and recovery engagement, supporting
best-practices in disaster management and fostering a dialogue between sectors.
Furthermore, CSR studies have tended to focus on western, industrialized countries, leaving out
corporate behavior and social policy in developing countries, where the bulk of the backlash against
corporations regarding globalization and privatization has occurred. Thus, the research focus on
CSR in multinational and national companies in a developing country, India, is a valuable
contribution as it provides an application of the theory to an important context. The research also
provides an understanding of how organizations formalize or institutionalize new aspects of CSR
into new or existing programs.
The following chapters seek to clarify corporate motivations and roles in disaster response and
recovery. Chapter two frames the problem of growing disaster vulnerability, builds the need for
corporate involvement and examines what is currently known about corporate participation in
disasters. Chapter three synthesizes the elements of corporate social responsibility that are relevant
to corporate participation in disasters and the findings of existing studies on this topic to build a
theoretical foundation for the analysis of the data. Chapter four presents the methodology for the
qualitative study of the Gujarat Earthquake, the approach for data analysis and the limitations of the
research design. Chapter five provides an overview the Gujarat Earthquake, exploring the local
context and the activities of government and civil society actors in disaster response and recovery.
The analysis is divided into two chapters. Chapter six presents the findings on corporate rationale
and motivations behind involvement in disaster response and recovery in the Gujarat Earthquake,
while chapter seven focuses on corporate roles and the implementation of initiatives in disaster
response and recovery. Chapter eight, the conclusion, summarizes the findings, provides a
comparison to the theoretical framework, and introduces key policy implications and suggestions for
next steps.
Chapter 2
Corporate Involvement in Disaster Response and Recovery
The private sector has not figured prominently in the discourse on disaster management.
Instead, the field has tended to focus on strategies involving traditional actors in disaster
management such as governments, international organizations, NGOs, communities and the media.
The exclusion of corporations from the disaster management system reflects a missed opportunity
to capitalize on the strengths and resources of the private sector to alleviate human suffering and
lessen property loss associated with large-scale natural disasters. As increased globalization is being
matched with demands for corporate responsibility, there exists a unique potential for the
emergence of broader social roles for corporations (Yamamoto 1999; Margolis & Walsh 2001).
Specifically, the retraction of the state and the expansion of the private sector worldwide has
"created an opportunity for new institutions and networks to deal with disaster vulnerability,
preparedness, response and recovery" (Pelling 2003b: 63). Since different actors offer different
bundles of skills and resources, engaging a range of private sector industries would mean tapping
into varied collections of resources and expertise that can complement existing actors and
approaches.
Although the private sector has been active commercially in disaster management, the need
for stronger voluntary participation of corporations is becoming apparent. Accordingly, the private
sector is playing a role in the areas of disaster response and recovery in a philanthropic, yet engaged,
capacity. There is an increasing demand and interest within the disaster management community in
fostering greater cooperation across sectors through the building of inter-sectoral partnerships. In
fact, the World Health Organization acknowledges that the "new paradigm for emergency
management... [is] based on formal partnerships between all parts of society", including public,
private, and voluntary sectors (WHO as quoted in Twigg 2001: 17). Corporations can help build
social capital through such partnerships and initiatives in disaster management. As experts assert that
structural change in disaster management is possible, gaining a more complete understanding of
private sector participation in disasters appears key to shaping a more inclusive and comprehensive
system in the future (Pelling 2003: 64).
In order to evaluate the role that corporations are playing in disaster response and recovery,
it is imperative to first gain an understanding of disaster vulnerability in developing countries, the
cycle of disaster management, the existing actors and response system, and emerging models and
examples of corporate participation. Focusing on natural disasters, or those humanitarian crises
triggered by natural hazards such as earthquakes, landslides, cyclones, flooding and hurricanes, the
following analysis aims to underscore the urgency of the disaster vulnerability situation and why
corporate participation is integral to developing a sustainable and effective disaster management
strategy. Central to this discussion is uncovering the gap in our knowledge about corporate
involvement in disasters in order to guide subsequent inquiry into private sector activities in high
vulnerability communities (HVC) in developing countries.
Disaster Vulnerability in Developing Countries
The outlook for disaster vulnerability worldwide is an alarming one, which requires critical
attention and comprehensive response. Disasters are increasing in frequency and severity, with
exponential growth in the past decade (UNDP 2004). In 1999 alone, the UN estimates that there
were 700 large-scale disasters which left 100,000 dead and $100 billion in economic losses (SGR
2001). Human losses have been decreasing, but remain high. For those surviving victims, the social
impacts of disasters continue long after official responses cease. Economic losses from natural
disasters in the past decade are estimated at $700 billion and are expected to grow to as much as $10
trillion in the next 20 years (Zimerell 2003). The profound social and economic consequences of
these events disproportionately affect developing countries, where 90% of disaster victims live
(IFRC 2003). Thus, increased disaster vulnerability in developing countries poses a major challenge to
development, often setting back considerable strides made in infrastructure, health, economic
development, and education. It is also likely that responses to an increasing number of natural disasters
will divert funds that would otherwise be allocated for development.
Although economic losses tend to be higher in developed countries, developing countries
typically face a greater relative effect which impacts their economic horizon (Benson 1998). Besides
inflicting significant costs associated with physical destruction and rebuilding, disasters often weaken the
global competitiveness of vulnerable countries. Uncertainties following disasters can hinder investment
in long-term commercial relationships (Anderson 2002: 67). On the other hand, some types of economic
activity and poor regulatory environments can increase a country's economic vulnerability to natural
disasters (Anderson 2002: 67). While losses in developed countries are largely covered by insurance,
developing countries usually lack widely available insurance policies and risk-management
instruments. Additionally, the reliance on foreign aid and assistance after disasters also serves as a
disincentive for government to support greater risk management policies. Overall, disaster
vulnerability in developing countries also reflects the exposure of vital economic assets as evidenced
in the increase in economic losses per hazard (Anderson 2002; UNDP 2004).
There are several factors that are contributing to the rise in vulnerability to disaster situations
in developing countries. Population growth, demographic pressure, inadequate shelter, unplanned
urbanization, and environmental degradation are creating increased disaster vulnerability as these
conditions place populations in environments where there is greater likelihood that a natural hazard
such as a heavy rainfall will escalate to an actual disaster state. Augmenting this trend is the fact that
migration, poverty, unemployment, and AIDS are driving more people to settle on marginal lands in
disaster-prone areas. Sub-standard structures and poor infrastructure stemming from (cheap) designs
that do not factor in seismic and other risks also remain potential liabilities (UNISDR 2002; SGR
2001). For example, in both El Salvador and India, recent earthquakes had devastating impacts on
the physical environment and economy; whereas, an earthquake of similar magnitude in Seattle did
not nearly have the same consequences based on the quality of construction (SGR 2001). There is
also growing acceptance that the forces of globalization have compounded the exposure to
environmental hazards by fostering conditions that indirectly increase disaster vulnerability,
suggesting that global change processes are linked to local disasters (Pelling 2003b). Some have also
argued that globalized societies have a greater risk because of the increased dependency on
infrastructure as vital "life-lines" in both urban and rural areas.
Disaster vulnerability and severity has the potential to create a development crisis in disaster-
prone developing countries (Ozerdam 2003; Pelling 2003b; UNDP 2004), with economic and social
ramifications that also impact corporations and their working environments, operations and
markets. Although generally localized, disasters can destroy the economic and social capital
necessary for a healthy economy and society. As already mentioned, disasters can undermine global
competitiveness. This situation suggests that even from a strictly business-objective standpoint, the
private sector can derive value from mitigating against disasters and ensuring quick and effective
responses when they do happen. Furthermore, as companies are expanding their presence and rights
throughout the world, many scholars have suggested that they have a concomitant responsibility to
use their robust assets in ways that benefit society (Pelling 2003a; Roberts 2003; Waddock 2002;
Yamamoto 1999). Corporate involvement in the formation of more comprehensive disaster
response and recovery that lessens human suffering within HVCs is one illustration of the expanded
roles and responsibilities of corporations in a globalizing world. Thus, given the environment of
increasing vulnerability of populations and assets in disaster-prone developing countries, corporate
interventions reflect one dimension of the effort to address this alarming situation.
The Cycle of Disaster Management
High vulnerability communities face the need for policy and action in all stages of the
disaster management cycle. The disaster management field has tended to break down its activities
into phases expressed as a cycle that includes prevention, mitigation, preparedness, disaster impact
(event), response, recovery, and development, as summarized in Figure 2.1 (Carter 1992). This
depiction serves only as a schematic guide and is not intended to suggest that disaster-related
activities fall into discreet categories that do not overlap programmatically or temporally. In fact,
segments often tend to merge, for example, when recovery activities are linked to mitigation
measures. This cycle is introduced to provide a platform for discussing where the disaster field is
currently placing its strongest emphasis and for identifying where corporations have been active.
Impact
Preparedness Response
Mitigation Recovery
Development
KEY DISASTER DEFINITIONS:
RESPONSE immediate relief efforts that are aimed at assessing
needs, reducing suffering, limiting the spread and consequences
of the disaster, and laying groundwork for rehabilitation
RECOVERY: rehabilitation and reconstruction initiatives that
deal with the long-term needs of communitiesfollowing
disasters, namely the restoration of social functionseconomic
activities, and physical structure
MITIGATION: permanent reduction of disaster risk, includes
reducing vulnerability and reducing the impact of the natural
hazard
Figure 2.1: Disaster Management Cycle and Definitions
Adaptedfrom: Carter (1992) and WHO/EHA (2002)
The greatest majority of resources, including materials and expertise, are mobilized in the
immediate wake of a disaster, during the relief or response period. It is also the point at which there
is concerted coordination between a variety of actors including the government, international
organizations and humanitarian NGOs. Until recently, most national governments and international
donors directed the bulk of their funding and programs toward relief and recovery. There has been a
growing interest in mitigation and prevention measures among disaster actors since the 1970's and in
the last decade it has started to become a priority on many of their agendas (Maskrey 1989; Below
and Guha-Sahir 2002). Increasing vulnerability and severity of disaster impacts pose a challenge to
development that has helped to stimulate this policy shift.
Disaster reduction policies aim to increase the resiliency of societies to natural hazards
(UNISDR 2002). The current vision which is emerging is that natural hazard mitigation is essential
to achieving sustainable development. Mileti (1999: 2) builds on this idea, defining sustainable
hazard mitigation as fusing "wise management of natural resources with local economic and social
resiliency.. .part of a much larger context". In this respect, there is a growing call for greater private
sector involvement in mitigation and prevention through partnerships and direct activities. In
particular, several advocates have suggested unique opportunities in insurance and construction
industries to foster better building codes and construction techniques (Mileti 1999; SGR 2001).
Disaster vulnerability has predominately been addressed in the scholarly discourse on
disasters within the realm of mitigation policies and strategies. The proactive/preventative nature of
disaster mitigation makes it the justifiably preferred approach that is in line with demands for
sustainable development. Accordingly, there has been a declining emphasis on response and
recovery in the literature on disaster vulnerability. However, vulnerability within communities is
something that requires attention across all components of the disaster cycle. Thus, current trends in
disaster vulnerability fall short in that they lose sight of several key areas of disaster management. In
particular, since communities need to be able to respond to a disaster when it does occur and
recovery can serve as a platform for mitigation and sustainable development (Pelling, 2003a),
disaster response and recovery remain important, if understudied, components of disaster
vulnerability. Additionally, the private sector has tended to concentrate its efforts in HVCs in the
areas of post-impact response and recovery. In sum, disaster vulnerability is an issue that cuts across
the entire disaster management cycle and requires greater exploration in terms of response and
recovery.
Governmental and Civil Society Actors in Disaster Response
Disaster response and emergency management occur within complex political, social, and
economic environments (Waugh 1990). Since these broader social, political, economic, cultural and
institutional factors impact the shape of preparedness, response and mitigation practices, the face of
the disaster management process will vary greatly in different contexts. Generally, in a large-scale
natural disaster in a developing country for which the government allows for foreign aid and
humanitarian support, the disaster response often includes the participation of national, state and
local governments, international organizations (intergovernmental), bilateral government teams,
international NGOs, national and local NGOs, private companies, and affected communities. It
should be noted that the international disaster relief system is a "non-system", since there are many
different actors coordinating to meet needs as they are assessed (Brown 1979).
In a major disaster, the national government typically bears primary responsibility for
response operations in the initial stages, selecting the appropriate ministries and government
agencies to engage. Depending on its capacity, the government will be involved in needs assessment,
coordination, and execution of relief operations. If the scale of a disaster exceeds the government's
ability to respond independently, they will generally initiate requests for international assistance and
will continue to play a role in monitoring requirements and coordinating/directing resources.
Methods and activities will vary by government since much depends on the institutional and policy
framework in place. Many countries have designated specific national disaster relief/emergency
management agencies. There is a growing trend toward deployment of military and civil defense
assets such as aircraft, helicopters, boats and logistics capabilities in disaster situations (Ozerdem
2003).
In natural disasters that involve an international response, UN agencies and major
international relief organizations (such as the IFRC) play a central role (see Appendix A for an
Acronym List). Under the auspices of OCHA, the UNDAC team will mobilize, direct and
coordinate the relief activities of UN agencies and work to coordinate efforts with other
intergovernmental bodies and NGOs. The involvement of non-governmental organizations is
growing in humanitarian assistance. Increasing funding is being channeled directly to them and their
activities and reach are expanding (SGR 2001, Ozerdem 2003). Civil society organizations,
particularly those at the grassroots level with local knowledge, serve an important function in
delivering relief to community members and tend to play an important role in recovery and
mitigation because of their long-term development commitment. With the number of actors
increasing in the response field, greater synergy in terms of collaboration and coordination becomes
imperative (SGR 2001).
Effective preparedness and response are instrumental to saving lives, reducing injuries and
minimizing property loss (Mileti 1999: p.239). The deployment of resources and personnel in
disaster relief operations has been faster and more effective than in the past, due to advancements in
information technology, increased coordination, mobilization of a variety of actors with broad-
ranging expertise, better early warning systems and growing expertise in disaster relief (SGR).
Despite improvements in relief operations over the past decade and in light of exponential growth in
disasters amid declining funding (Benthall 3), the system continues to face pressure to improve
operations in ways that produce more effective action and help reduce the consequences of disasters
on affected populations.
In this regard, the UN, national governments and civil society organizations are beginning to
acknowledge that there is a role to be played by the private sector in response and recovery. The
growing number of humanitarian actors has meant more effective consolidated efforts but gaps that
remain in the system could be met in part by corporations. Essentially, a wealth of private assets
remains untapped. Private companies have access to many relevant resources not available within
community organizations - machinery, technology, expertise and funding - which could be used to
complement efforts in both the response and recovery phases. Existing disaster actors are
expressing the need to begin a dialogue to gain a better understanding of how corporations feel they
can actually contribute to disaster response, depending on their organization size and industry. To
improve disaster response and coordination, the UN has recommended engaging the private sector
"to develop more widespread corporate responsibility and suggest avenues for positive support"
(SGR, 2001). These ideas are based on the emerging premise that targeted engagement of the private
sector could serve to strengthen the existing system.
Increased mobilization of private sector resources also serves to increase local and national
capacity to respond to disasters. Foreign aid in disaster relief ideally aims to lessen the need for
international assistance in future disasters by building local capacity, supporting decentralized
response, and strengthening indigenous prevention and response capabilities (SRG 2001: 26). In
strengthening these capabilities, government, NGO and community responses receive the thrust of
the attention while capacity-building through the private sector is uniformly overlooked. Since
private sector assets are essentially localized within a country- whether derived from local, national
or multinational companies - taking advantage of these internal resources and expertise builds
greater local and national ownership of disaster response. In a way, establishing the private sector as
a valid disaster actor has the potential to build new endogenous response mechanisms within
developing countries, eventually becoming part of society's in-built institutional processes (Albala -
Bertrand 1993: p.8 8).
Corporate Participation in Response and Recovery
There have been few systematic studies on private-sector involvement in disaster situations
(Mileti 1999: p.22 4), with most information available in the form of newspaper articles, press
releases, newsletters, or websites. Although we know that corporations have focused their disaster
initiatives in the response and recovery phases, it remains difficult to discern a comprehensive
picture of private sector efforts since we have limited knowledge of the role they are playing and
their motivations for philanthropic involvement.
Corporations have been involved in disasters on both commercial and philanthropic terms.
Commercially, national or state governments procure materials, services and technologies (such as
construction or logistics) from the private sector as needed in the emergency response phase for a
contracted fee. From a philanthropic or voluntary standpoint (which is the focus of this analysis),
corporate participation has often come in the form of monetary aid and in-kind material donations,
although corporations are making new substantive contributions by utilizing technology, supporting
secondment of expertise (employees) and building programmatic partnerships. The portrait of
corporations in response and recovery is still evolving. Many companies have tended to satisfy
unmet requirements unique to a particular disaster situation/location, often identified by
government or civil society partners. From what is known, it seems that corporations are
augmenting existing efforts of government and NGOs to create more robust initiatives. Emerging
examples of voluntary or philanthropic private sector participation in disaster response and recovery
can be categorized into corporate donation schemes, communications and technologies for relief,
medical donations, and formalized relief organizations. Exploring these activities yields an emerging
position for corporations in disasters.
Many corporations have developed and institutionalized donation strategies for disaster
relief. Such donation schemes consist of donation partnerships with specific NGOs or the creation
of employee donation programs. Although donation schemes are important in light of funding
issues for humanitarian organizations, it is possible to envision the private sector playing a deeper
and more engaged role than monetary contribution in disaster relief and recovery. More in-depth
engagement is already occurring in areas such as information and communications. Hence,
participation in both fund-raising and direct action seem possible and desirable.
Certain industries have clear synergies with disaster management and have thus played a
more prominent role to date in relief operations. The UN has pointed to industries such as
communications, transportation and infrastructure as areas of greater public-private collaboration in
disasters (SGR 2001). With reliable and effective information and communication being essential in
emergency management situations, several information technology companies have been involved in
recent crises (CSR Forum 2004: http://www.iblf.org). This private sector engagement has mostly
taken the form of partnerships between corporations and UN or government agencies. Similarly,
demand for heavy machinery, logistics and construction/engineering expertise is high during large-
scale disaster responses and as such, philanthropic mobilization in this area is emerging. Experts also
see the potential to link business imperatives with socially constructed works, particularly in
insurance and construction (Pelling 2003a: 75).
Medicine and pharmaceuticals represent another disaster-relevant industry. Medical
donations have long-been a component of private sector contributions to disaster relief. Although
there is often a high demand for medical supplies and medicines in the wake of a disaster, corporate
donations in this area have been infamous for being inappropriate, expired or donated for the wrong
reasons (CSR Forum 2004). Despite this critical shortcoming, medical donations have the possibility
of being very beneficial to government and humanitarian organizations operating in the disaster
field, if the appropriate protocols are followed.
On a country and even global level, individual or groups of companies have been developing
partnerships with the public sector and community organizations to offer philanthropic response
and recovery to communities (CSR Forum 2004). These more formalized responses allow for higher
impact through dedicated resources and field collaboration as compared to unilateral, ad-hoc efforts.
They also allow for greater local capacity building because of the institutionalization of corporations
as disaster actors. Examples of such private sector organizations, which are coordinating with
humanitarian organizations for more effective disaster response, are the Corporate Network for
Disaster Response (CNDR), a coalition of businesses established in 1990 in the Philippines, and the
Disaster Resource Network (DRN), a global organization of companies with regional affiliates
formed 2001 (Lim 2003; http://www.weforum.org 2004). Both groups aim to operate as
intermediate organizations to facilitate the dedication of private sector resources to match
government and NGO needs in disaster situations.
The foregoing analysis of existing private sector participation implies the emerging form of
corporate participation is collaborative partnerships with public and civil society actors.
Collaboration ensures that corporations are actually fifing perceived gaps, gaining disaster expertise,
building trust, sharing learning and knowledge, creating formalized responses and dedicating
resources (often in advance). Private sector participation in partnerships also deals with
humanitarian funding shortfalls (SGR 2001) . Since corporations usually not expected to be
community-facing organizations, partnerships provide them an intermediary that has disaster
expertise and closer relationships to beneficiaries (Yamamoto 1999). Current corporate activities in
disaster response and recovery also suggest that corporations can and do contribute in the areas of
their core competency like information technology, communications, or construction, if they are
relevant to a particular disaster situation.
Conclusion
The potential exponential growth and increased impact of disasters have stimulated a call for
multi-sectoral cooperation in disaster response and recovery to achieve a more comprehensive
approach to vulnerability challenges. The private sector is an important, yet understudied, partner in
disaster collaboration. Corporations are already actively participating in disaster management both
commercially and philanthropically. Although there is knowledge that corporations involved in
disaster management have tended to focus their initiatives in disaster response and recovery, there
remains limited understanding of their voluntary efforts, particularly with regard to why they
participate in disasters on a voluntary basis and the nature of their response and recovery programs.
Additionally, the disaster vulnerability literature's concentration on mitigation to address
vulnerability in developing countries, although important, overlooks the fact that the entire disaster
cycle needs to be addressed in vulnerable communities, including the more reactive phases following
a hazard event where corporations have concentrated their contributions.
These gaps in our knowledge about the fundamental behavior of corporations in disaster
situations, and the need to consider other aspects of the disaster management cycle beyond
mitigation, give rise to the two central questions being addressed in this research: 1) Why do firms
participate in disaster response and recovery on voluntary (i.e. philanthropic) terms; and 2) What is
the nature and implementation of these corporate initiatives in disaster response and recovery?
Knowledge about the motivations and activities that define corporate involvement in response and
recovery is essential to the development of a more complete portrait of the disaster relief system and
invaluable to guiding recommendations for future corporate involvement in disaster response and
recovery within high vulnerability communities in developing countries.
Chapter 3
Linking CSR to Disaster Response and Recovery
As vulnerability of populations in disaster-prone developing countries increases, the private
sector is beginning to play a more involved, voluntary/philanthropic role in disaster response and
recovery. Corporate participation has been highlighted as instrumental for achieving the level of
multi-sectoral collaboration that is necessary to meet the challenges of disaster vulnerability, yet little
understanding exists about why corporations would want to play such a role and the nature of their
interventions. Thus, a conceptual framework for evaluating corporate behavior is essential for
assessing why firms participate in disaster response and recovery on voluntary terms and for
understanding the characteristics of program implementation. The literature on Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR), which attempts to explain business relations with society, provides an
analytical lens for understanding organizational practices in corporate disaster relief and recovery.
Since the subsequent analysis will illustrate the emerging roles of corporations in disaster response
and recovery through an in-depth evaluation of private sector participation following the Gujarat
Earthquake, the framework employed draws on the conclusions of previous studies in CSR and
disasters, as well as both relevant CSR theories and practice, to facilitate interpretation of the case.
Corporate Social Responsibility
Although corporate social responsibility is a broad concept with multiple interpretations, it is
possible to gain a general understanding of this body of research while revealing dimensions of
particular relevance to corporate participation in disasters. Corporate social responsibility has
emerged as a discourse within organizational research over the past few decades to describe the
relationship between business and the larger society (McAdam and Leonard 2003: 36). Neoclassical
theorists, like Milton Friedman, propound that the responsibilities of the firm do not go beyond
maximizing shareholder wealth generation (Litz 1996; Silver 2001). However, this approach does not
adequately explain the breadth of corporate behavior and business's relationship with society
(Waddock 2002, Quazi and O'Brien 2000). In effect, several notions of corporate social
responsibility have evolved which assert that companies exist to serve both direct stakeholders and
the greater community (as a means for responding to public expectations). The CSR construct does
not imply a singular definition or general agreement, and conceptions of it vary with context and
across cultures (Snider, Hill and Martin 2003; Hill, Stephens and Smith 2003; Ibrahim and Abdul-
Rashid 2002; Boehm 2002). One definition often cited is that introduced by Wood (1991: 695):
The basic idea of corporate social responsibility is that business and society are interwoven rather than
distinct entities; therefore, society has certain expectations for appropriate business behavior and
outcomes.
To a degree, then, social responsibility can be understood as a response to societal expectation, as
well as a potential motivation behind some corporate actions that engage and benefit the larger
society.
There appears to be two major components of CSR, with definitions focusing on either
ethically-driven behavior or on activities that enhance corporate image and organizational benefits.
Kok et al. (Kok, Weile, McKenna and Brown 2001: 288) offer a notion of the ethical obligation of
companies to society, describing CSR as:
The obligation of the firm to use its resources in ways to benefit society, through committed
participation as a member of society, taking into account the society at large and improving the
welfare of society at large independent of direct gains to the company.
Similarly, Moir (2001: 17) elaborates on CSR as from an ethical perspective based on
resources, noting that social responsibility can be understood as a:
moral or ethical imperative that because business has resources, it is part of the role of business to
assist in solving social problems [and because business has resources and skills that] there is a quasi-
moral obligation to be involved [in society and societal problems].
From an organizational benefit approach, CSR is understood as a public relations tool for
corporations to project their corporate image and enhance reputation. In this respect,
corporations might also become involved in disaster initiatives as a way to display a positive
image to community, government and customers; therefore, benefiting from improved
relations with these groups.
In practice, CSR activities tend to reflect a mix of both motivations, with companies
stimulated by ethical concerns and indirect organizational benefits. Although CSR is a
normative theoretical discourse more than an empirical one, it does provide a valuable
foundation for understanding corporations' roles and motivations in natural disasters.
Corporate disaster initiatives appear to emerge from this logic of the obligation to utilize
accumulated skills and resources in meaningful ways for society, as relevant assets are drawn
on to significantly contribute to disaster management in the field.
Whether driven by ethics or benefits or both, it appears that CSR includes four dimensions:
economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic - all of which can be evaluated in terms of relationships
with stakeholders (Carroll 1999). Of particular relevance to corporate participation in disaster
response is the philanthropic angle of CSR. Unlike traditional charitable giving, CSR can be viewed
as pursuing "comprehensive philanthropic response" to social problems or issues that engage
stakeholders, particularly the community (Silver 2001: 233). As CSR activities, the emerging role of
corporations in this field is manifest in disaster initiatives that are voluntary, unpaid and altruistic,
which may also be driven by or result in organizational benefits such as image enhancement and
employee skill-building. Therefore, although some theorists suggest that the notions of mutual gain
and perceived long-term benefit to the company are integral to CSR (Hopkins 2003), a broader
reading of the existing literature suggests that altruistic and philanthropic activities can in fact fall
within the rubric of CSR, particularly when corporations define their activities as expressions of
social accountability and state a sense of responsibility to beneficiaries. This situation highlights the
debate about whether CSR is strictly a business strategy or whether it refers to business
contributions to the welfare of society, with responsibilities that go beyond profit-maximizing
behavior.
As mentioned, CSR introduces an expanded notion of the stakeholders to which
corporations are accountable. Traditionally, corporations have only been legally accountable to their
shareholders. In contrast, CSR recognizes employees, investors, customers, the environment, and
the broader community as valid stakeholders whose interests companies should consider (Carroll
1999). Thus, stakeholder theory frames CSR as the "ethical behavior of business towards
constituencies and stakeholders" (Hopkins 2003: 9). Most corporate social responsibility literature
deals with company self-regulation with respect to their environmental record, workplace
conditions, and human rights performance. In this regard, CSR refers to both a company's internal
practices as well as its impact on the world around it (Reder 1994). Additionally, CSR can be applied
to the actions corporations take beyond their operations, such as the commitment they make to
improve the communities in which they operate.
There is growing consensus that strong businesses require "healthy" communities and that
businesses should have a hand in community development. Corporate involvement in communities
is increasing (Hopkins 2003). The community dimension of CSR is particularly relevant since it
directly relates to the form of private sector participation witnessed in disaster response and
recovery, as corporate initiatives usually target affected communities as beneficiaries.
As corporations increase their awareness of their role in their communities, they are moving
away from charitable giving and are becoming more engaged and involved in working within their
locales to address social problems. Activities within communities often attempt to reinforce positive
images of the firm to both the community and the government. Working with community
organizations can grant legitimacy to corporate efforts and reinforce a positive identity (Silver 2001).
Looking at CSR on the community level, a study by Snider et al. (2003) reveals global corporations
tend to view communities as being comprised of different stakeholder groups: local community,
nation states in which they operate, and the world in general. Interest in natural disasters often
reflects companies' concerns about national interests (Snider et al. 2003). For example, companies
express the responsibility to "advance important national interests of particular countries, especially
in times of great urgency or need" like natural disasters (Snider et al. 2003: 185). Thus, although
corporate disaster efforts tend to be implemented on a local community scale, they may be driven by
national interest and humanitarian concern associated with the urgency of the extraordinary
circumstances.
CSR and Disasters
Since voluntary/philanthropic corporate actions in disaster response and recovery reflect a
benefit to society and at times, a commitment to serving community, it is possible to evaluate these
initiatives as expressions of CSR. Corporate involvement in disaster management has not received
much attention in scholarly discourse on corporate social responsibility. A recent study led by John
Twigg of the Benfield Greig Hazard Research Centre is one of the first attempts at evaluating CSR
and private sector participation in disasters (2001). In particular, his global overview and summary
findings for the affiliated country level reports completed by local scholars center on CSR in disaster
reduction. Hence, Twigg's study reflects the general focus on addressing vulnerability through
mitigation within the disaster management field.
Although directed towards mitigation, not response and recovery, Twigg's analysis applies
the components of CSR to disaster activities. He breaks down CSR and corporate disaster activities
into four major categories: Vision, Decision-making, Impementation and Impact. These categories actually
resonate with the research questions regarding the how and why of corporate activities in disaster
response and recovery. The vision and decision-making elements facilitate comprehending the
motivations and process behind corporate participation, while the implementation and impact
dimensions help explain what corporate activities look like on the ground and how to evaluate them.
Vision
Vision has been defined as a key driver behind CSR activities in disasters. It provides a
picture of the motivations for private sector involvement in disaster interventions and implications
for the nature and extent of support provided (Twigg 2001). Under the category of vision, the
findings of Twigg's study deduce that disaster activities are motivated by business interests, altruism
and philanthropy, although he concludes that only activities motivated by business interests,
however long-term, are actually valid expressions of CSR. The study pinpoints some indirect
benefits to business of disaster involvement such as image building and staff morale. He notes CSR
is just emerging in developing countries and therefore, recognition of the concept is often limited in
those countries. A tradition of philanthropy within a company tends to encourage CSR behavior.
Important elements under vision that explain motivation include the company's general attitude
towards social responsibility, anticipated benefits, and under whom the vision is being crafted.
The CSR literature further elaborates on the notion of vision and underlying motivations
more generally. Waddock (2002: 4) notes that good corporate citizens uphold "clear constructive
visions and core values", and that these values will guide their CSR activities. Motivations behind
CSR often fall within two competing fronts, one emanating from altruism and the other from self-
interest. For simplification, motivations can be understood in three fundamental ways: as business
strategy surrounding organizational benefits; as responsibility to community; and as altruistic
behavior that is ethically driven.
Theory asserts that CSR activities are motivated by the vision that being socially responsible
is "good for business", even if indirect (Hopkins 2003; Reder 1994). The idea of mutual gain is
embedded in this logic, with companies viewing CSR as an essential component of business strategy
(Yamamoto 1999). Thus, the literature on CSR motivations focuses on the desire of corporations to
achieve potential indirect benefits such as: improve corporate acceptability by stakeholders (Hopkins
2003); ameliorate corporate industrial relations (Hopkins 2003); enhance ability to attract new
investors (Hopkins 2003; Willmott); improve corporate reputation (Hopkins 2003; Woodward 2001;
Ibrahim and Abdul-Rashid 2002); elevate the company brand (Hilton and Gibbons 2002; Yamamoto
1999); achieve greater trust (Boehm 2002; Woodward 2001); increase employee allegiance, morale,
pride and competency (Willmott 2001; Reder 1994; Boehm 2002; Yamamoto 1999); gain insights
into customers and expand markets (Boehm 2002); and obtain positive responses from political
leaders and press, i.e., receive good PR (Boehm 2002). Overall, anticipated indirect organizational
benefits are important motivations behind CSR activity.
The literature also distinguishes a sense of responsibility to community as a motivation for
CSR activity. Companies may seek to build positive relationships with community (Woodward 2001;
Waddock 2002). This approach is related to stakeholder analysis and accountability, as there is an
emerging idea that business vitality and stability depends on the health of the communities and
societies within which they operate (Yamamoto 1999). Socially responsible businesses work to
preserve and expand social capital (Hopkins 2003), suggesting that companies may have a "welfare
responsibility" to communities in the form of social development initiatives and the like. It should
be noted that several scholars suggest that improving community quality and being responsible
members of the community may also improve long-run profitability for companies, making indirect
benefits also linked to increased stakeholder responsiveness (Ibrahim and Abdul-Rashid 2002;
Margolis and Walsh 2001).
Another rationale found in the literature for socially responsible activities is a more
traditional philanthropic one, although not outside the scope of CSR. Some theorists have suggested
that CSR activities may also be driven by altruistic or ethical feelings to do good for society (Quazi
and O'Brien 2000). This sentiment would also include the moral obligation to use the productive
resources of companies in ways that benefit society. As mentioned before, urgent situations of
national magnitude (like major natural disasters) can draw in companies based on an overriding
concern for national interests and development. In a sense, this type of motivation may be explained
as "doing the right thing." The various motivations that emerge in CSR theory and practice suggest a
way to evaluate the rationales of companies involved in disaster response and recovery on a
voluntary (non-commercial) basis.
Decision-making
Decision-making is a fundamental dimension of the process leading to corporate
involvement in disaster response and recovery. Twigg looks in-depth at decision-making in the
corporate mitigation context and concludes that expert and committed leadership are essential. He
notes that leadership is often top-down, with decisions being championed by the boards of
directors, senior managers or owners. It is not unusual for the primary supporter to be a single, high-
level individual within the organization. The study found that the importance of leadership in driving
decision-making does not seem to differ with organization size. Although Twigg includes the
formation of partnerships under decision-making, it appears more appropriate to address this
component within implementation.
CSR theory seems to echo the significance of leadership in the decision-making process that
leads to socially responsible action. CSR-oriented decision-making requires leaders within a company
to have personal vision and awareness, with "progressive, aware, and effective" managerial styles
(Waddock 2002: 15). Commitment from senior officers to achieve stated objectives is key, although
individual leadership will not replace the need for written value statements (Yamamoto 1999).
Boston College's Center for Corporate Leadership underscores in its standards of excellence the
need for senior executives to demonstrate their support, commitment and participation in
community and to build relationships with the community.
Leadership plays such a central role in decision-making for CSR because firms allow for individual
managerial discretion (Carroll 1979). Thus, the philosophy of top management remains a primary
factor in contributing to corporate social awareness and action (Ibrahim and Abdul-Rashid 2002).
Implementation
Twigg also explores implementation of corporate initiatives to uncover the nature and extent
of interventions. He looks at operational issues that companies face in their disaster mitigation
efforts and how these are approached and resolved. In the realm of mitigation, he discovers that
companies are engaged in activities such as providing information materials, lending in-kind support,
sponsoring research, and creating committees and discussion groups. Additionally, he concludes that
funding for initiatives tend to be once-off.
In the structure of initiatives, partnerships receive critical attention since they are portrayed
as the new paradigm in disaster management. In his research, Twigg finds that NGOs and
government tend to be the initiator of partnerships with the private sector. He discovers that
government support in creating enabling environments is essential for inter-sectoral partnerships.
Collective initiatives among the private sector, such as business associations or dedicated
organizations, are also influential in facilitating collaboration. Although partnerships with NGOs are
viewed as a viable model for private sector participation in disasters, Twigg concludes that
companies prefer unilateral action to partnership and allow for only minimal community
participation.
The CSR literature addresses implementation to a lesser degree than the principles
surrounding CSR behavior. However, some theorists do emphasize CSR as responsiveness, in the
sense that CSR is about actually implementing activities and proving values through action, not just
musing about obligation and responsibility (Bauer and Ackerman 1976; Hilton and Gibbons 2002).
CSR has been described as "collaboration" and as an "economic, social or psychological contract
between corporate leaders and community leaders" (Boehm 2002: 173). Corporate involvement in
community initiatives reflects "new patterns of philanthropy" that suggest a deeper engagement in
society. In terms of taking action in community, Hopkins (2003) defines four types of business
relationships with community: charity; social investment in educational and social initiatives;
partnerships with local organizations including lending of equipment or human resources for a
specific time; and ethical production of goods that society needs. Thus, there are a range of ways
businesses may implement CSR activities in communities although there is a lack of writing on the
actual structure and nature of interventions. Unilateral initiatives and collaborative partnerships in
community-based operations appear to reflect the types of corporate engagement in disaster
response and recovery that is occurring.
As corporations move away from traditional charitable giving and towards more community
involvement, partnerships with NGOs are becoming an increasing form of intervention (Waddock
2002). Yamamoto notes that while writing on corporate responsibility has been prolific, there has
been little in-depth analysis on the pattern of NGO-corporate partnership. She attempts to expound
on the nature of emerging corporate-NGO partnerships in the social development context.
Corporations appear to partner with NGOs for community initiatives because NGOs tend to
understand local needs, language, and culture, and have development expertise and acceptance
within the community (Yamamoto 1999). NGOs chose to partner with corporations to diversify
funding sources, to gain professional skills, to benefit from the expertise of seconded employees,
and to expand political influence. Since mutual suspicion still exists between the two sectors, use of
intermediary organizations has also been a successful approach (Yamamoto 1999).
Impact
Building on implementation, an understanding of the impact that corporate disaster
initiatives are having on beneficiaries and the overall response and recovery system is important for
measuring the effectiveness and contribution of the private sector's voluntary efforts. Twigg defines
impact as the outcomes and effectiveness of corporate interventions, lessons learned and
implications for future involvement. Impact can be broken down into: a) monitoring and evaluation
- assessing the success of project and the extent to which goals were met; and b) replicability and
sustainability - the capacity to do similar activities in the future. A limitation surrounding Twigg's
study and many other CSR evaluations is that impact is assessed from the firm's perspective as
opposed to the direct and indirect beneficiaries and collaborators. Understanding impact is
important since outcomes will generally influence how the corporate disaster initiative is valued by
other sectors and the community, as well as whether corporations will be likely to repeat their efforts
in future disasters.
Along the lines of impact analysis, the literature reports increased weight being placed on
social reporting of CSR measures (Hopkins 2003), since companies are finding it necessary to
establish a process for evaluating their activities (Waddock 2002). Social reporting is also perceived
as a method of self-presentation and impression management (Snider et al. 2003). In general, little is
understood about evaluating impacts and how to interpret results even though it is considered
crucial for greater sustainability of the private sector as an actor in disaster response.
Twigg on Relief
Although the Benfield Report focuses on disaster mitigation, Twigg (2002) does make some
key observations from his data as it relates to corporate involvement in disaster relief. He found that
companies were "often very willing to respond to disasters through donations of money to
emergency appeals and in-kind support such as provision of relief goods, transport and
communication facilities" (2001: 10). His data suggest altruism as the motivation behind corporate
initiatives. He classifies corporate efforts in disaster response as mostly ad-hoc, once-off and short-
term although occasionally there is more strategic support. Despite the de-emphasis on response,
relief is highlighted as a "foundation for mitigation" (Twigg 2001: 12).
Conclusion
Corporate social responsibility (CSR), which attempts to explain business relations with
society offers a lens with which to view corporate participation in disasters. In particular, stakeholder
analysis, commitment to community, and ethical obligations to use company resources in ways that
have a positive impact on society are dimensions of CSR which have particular relevance for
understanding corporate disaster initiatives. Twigg's study and other reports from Benfield Greig
Hazard Research Centre which look at CSR and disaster reduction identify four aspects of CSR in
disasters: vision, decision-making, implementation and impact. These categories provide a basic
framework for assessing why corporations voluntarily participate in disaster response and recovery
and what roles they are playing in the field. However, there are still gaps in our understanding of
corporate disaster participation since CSR has never been researched in terms of response and
recovery. In particular, we lack an understanding of implementation and how partnerships are
actually working in practice. Thus, using the existing CSR literature and Twigg's studies in corporate
disaster mitigation to guide the subsequent analysis, it is likely that the findings will suggest that
additional elements and an expanded framework for understanding corporate participation in
disasters.
Chapter 4
Research Methodology
A significant role for the private sector is beginning to emerge in disaster response and
recovery. Although mitigation has become the predominant policy emphasis in disaster
management, response and recovery remain important areas for addressing disaster vulnerability in
developing countries. Thus, a greater understanding of the motivations and execution of corporate
disaster efforts is necessary to strengthen and guide future corporate involvement. Concepts drawn
from the literature on corporate social responsibility provide a framework for understanding
corporate rationale and activities in the disaster context. In order to answer the central questions
posed in this thesis regarding why companies participate in disaster response and what the
implementation of disaster management initiatives looks like, corporate responses to the Gujarat
Earthquake in India in 2001 were studied.
The primary factors for selecting the Gujarat Earthquake as a case/location for
comprehensive investigation were the severe magnitude of destruction, the high level of corporate
response, the developing country context, the existence of disaster research institutes, and the
linkages to the global economy in the state of Gujarat. The timing and distance of the event, which
occurred three years ago, was recent enough to anticipate accurate recollections, yet sufficiently
distant to determine whether program goals were completed and whether company commitment
was ongoing. Although the Gujarat earthquake has been the subject of many reports, including an
investigation of corporate social responsibility and disaster mitigation in Gujarat generally (Bhatt
2002), these studies were completed in a more descriptive, fact-finding manner and do not provide
in-depth qualitative analysis regarding corporate motivations and program implementation.
The companies studied in this research had several commonalities, which include: an
articulated commitment to CSR that was incorporated in some form into their operations, ongoing
social programs/initiatives, large-scale firm size measured as significant sales within India, and a
major response effort to the Gujarat earthquake (all but one having a broader intervention than a
monetary donation). A differentiating factor within the sample was that half the companies are
multinational corporations, with the remainder being major national (Indian) companies. The sample
represented a diverse range of industries, from insurance, banking, automobile, cement, engineering,
agribusiness, pharmaceuticals and IT/Communications to diversified business groups (see Table
3.1). This comparative case design allows an analysis of the similarities and differences in
motivations and implementation of corporate sector initiatives in disaster management.
Company Name Scale Industry
Hindustan Construction Company (HCC) National Construction/Engineering
Reliance National Diversified Business
Ambuja Cement National Cement
TATA National Diversified Business
HDFC National Banking
IFFCO National Fertilizer
IBM Multi-National Information Technology
Ericsson Multi-National Communications
Citibank Multi-National Banking
General Motors Multi-National Automobiles
New York Life Multi-National Insurance
Pfizer Multi-National Pharmaceuticals
Table 3.1: Company Sample by Name, Scale, and Industry
Data for the examination of corporate responses to the Gujarat Earthquake were collected
through semi-structured, in-depth interviews with 12 companies. Participants for company
interviews were selected based on their role and position within the organization and their
involvement in managing the company's disaster response efforts. Most interviewees were senior
operational managers or directors of corporate affairs/communications, who were well-informed
about the company's policies,, decision-making, and disaster-related initiatives following the Gujarat
earthquake. Interviews ranged from one to three individuals being interviewed simultaneously, with
the number varying according to company preference. Key individuals were identified through press
releases, websites, telephone inquiries, and the assistance of my local contacts at Hindustan
Construction Company. Potential interviewees were contacted via email and/or telephone. All
organizations contacted chose to participate and the interviews were conducted over a three week
period.
Informed consent of participants was received prior to conducting interviews. The interview
was organized around 26 questions covering topics such as the role and motivations of disaster
response efforts as well as general company social policies (see Appendix B). The questions served
as launching points for in-depth probing of issues. In terms of timeframe, the discussion focused on
the activities of participating companies regarding their disaster response and rehabilitation activities
over the three year period from the earthquake event in 2001 to the present. Although only a
limited number of interviews were conducted, the validity of the research design is based on the
depth and length of these interviews. Interviews spanned from 40 minutes to two-hours, with an
average interview lasting approximately 75 minutes. Interviews were conducted in-person, on-
location in India, with the exception of three telephone interviews which were conducted from
Mumbai. Conversations were tape-recorded and later transcribed for analysis.
Interviews were supplemented with data from additional sources. Some companies supplied
substantiating materials such as annual reports and films on their disaster response efforts. Overall,
newspaper articles, company documents, newsletters, reports, social audits, films and presentations
provided further information on both corporate philosophies and participation following the
Gujarat earthquake. A grounded theory approach, as explained later, was used to analyze interview
transcripts and supplemental data.
Limitations of the Study
It is important to acknowledge the potential biases inherent in such a research design. In
light of the analytical framework proposed in the preceding chapter, the key limitations of the
sample and methodology are explained below. Although these biases create boundaries for
interpretation, the strength of the case structure and the thorough data analysis approach provide a
foundation for rigorous examination of the issues and enhance the validity of the findings.
Exemplary companies /cases
The first limitation of this research is that the companies included in the sample might be
exemplary in their class by virtue of the fact they have articulated CSR programs and their disaster
management activities were viewed both internally and by beneficiaries as successful.' Thus, it may
be fair to suggest that they do not reveal a complete picture of the types of corporate involvement in
disaster response, the effectiveness of corporations as disaster actors, and motivations for
participation, even for the Gujarat Earthquake case. For example, there was a government scheme
supporting corporate adoption of villages in Gujarat which has been widely denounced as a failure
because corporations did not live up to local expectations of their role in the community. The
program became viewed as a publicity stunt because several participating companies received media
coverage but then withdrew from these areas following the relief period. In general, companies that
were solely involved in the relief phase and not rehabilitation have received harsher criticism. 2
One disaster, one location
The research examines the responses to only one natural disaster, an earthquake, in one
specific location, India. This design implies that some of the findings are likely to be heavy related to
the specific context, such as, the institutional arrangements in India and the type and magnitude of
the disaster. Therefore, the extent to which the data reveals information about the nature of
corporate involvement in disasters that can be generalized to other contexts is limited.
' Beneficiaries' perception of the success of these initiatives is only an assertion of the companies themselves and
not substantiated by direct feedback from the beneficiaries.
2 The Gujarat Exhibit at the World Social Forum (January 2004, Mumbai) was highly critical of the corporate
responses to the Gujarat earthquake, particularly in terms of not meeting expectations beyond the relief phase. See
Appendix C.
Country-specific understanding of CSR
Since the analysis utilizes the framework of corporate social responsibility to analyze Indian
companies and MNCs operating in India, there is a major question about the degree to which their
corporate disaster responses were rooted in uniquely Indian conceptions of philanthropy versus
emerging notions of corporate social responsibility. Specifically, several industrial houses in India
have a tradition of philanthropy which may now be fused to the emerging rhetoric of CSR. As a
result, further probing on the companies' understanding of CSR was often pursued to mitigate for
this bias.
Individual vs. company view
The research relies heavily on responses of individuals within the organizations. This limitation
makes it difficult to distinguish to what extent the interviewees' responses reflect their personal
ideologies and perspectives as compared to explaining their understanding of the company line.
Several of the interviewees, particularly those working in corporate affairs/communication or
community development, disclosed that they came from social development or social work
backgrounds. Such a background is not likely to reflect average company employees in those
institutions and indicates that they might be inclined to have higher social goals for the company
than other decision-makers in their organization.
Lack of local company perspective
The study only focuses on large-scale national and multinational companies that responded to
the Gujarat Earthquake, leaving out the important perspective and experience of local companies.
Although local companies were part of the original research design, identifying companies and
establishing contacts was very difficult and could not be accomplished within the research
timeframe. Varying the levels of the companies (local, nation, multinational) would have provided
greater room for comparison between corporate efforts.
Companies talking about themselves
Only corporations were interviewed about their experiences, while the beneficiaries of their
projects or other actors in the field were not. This was a purposive decision to limit the scope of the
analysis. Therefore the analysis only reflects the companies' perceptions of their own actions.
Although it is beyond the scope of this analysis, a broader understanding of corporations as actors in
disaster management requires data on the perspectives of direct beneficiaries, governmental
agencies, and local and international NGOs.
Data Analysis
Utilizing a grounded theory approach (Strauss and Corbin 1990), the data analysis involved
identifying themes/patterns and clustering components through an iterative process based on
successive readings of the interview transcripts and completing comparisons/contrasts between
company cases. An important feature of the grounded theory approach is that it facilitates
recognition of new or unanticipated elements and dynamics. Consequently, some factors, not
accounted for in the original framework, emerged in the analysis.
Chapter 5
The Gujarat Earthquake
Background
Figure 3.1: Map of Gujarat Earthquake Impact Area
source: http://www.mapsofmdia.com
On January 26, 2001, the country's Republic Day, a severe earthquake measuring 7.7 (some
estimate 6.9) on the Richter scale hit India just before 9:00 a.m. local time. The earthquake lasted
around two minutes, during which time the vast majority of the destruction occurred, although
numerous aftershocks followed. The epicenter was just outside the city of Bhuj in the northwestern
state of Gujarat (see Figure 3.1 above). The initial tremor was felt throughout parts of India and as
far way as the neighboring countries of Nepal and Pakistan. The earthquake was the second largest
recorded in Indian history and the most severe in recent times.
The earthquake caused a massive disaster situation, leaving over 20,000 people dead and an
estimated 146,000 injured (Bhatt, 2002: 3). In addition to this tremendous death toll, victims also
suffered the loss of personal property and livelihoods and faced major long-term social impacts. In
Kutch, the most heavily damaged district of the state, there were some towns and villages where
over 90% of the buildings were destroyed. As many as 16 to 20 million people were affected, with
nearly 600,000 victims left homeless. Public infrastructure also took a major hit in the state with
considerable damage to roads, bridges, water infrastructure and power systems. Approximately
11,600 schools, two district hospitals and thousands of health clinics were also ruined. Given the
extent of the destruction, the economic losses were acute. In a joint assessment, the World Bank and
the Asian Development Bank estimated asset losses at $2.1 billion with another expected $2.3 billion
for reconstruction costs.
The State of Gujarat
Gujarat is the most northwesterly state in India and borders Pakistan to the north, the
Arabian Sea to the west and south, and the Indian states of Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, and
Maharashtra to the east. It is the tenth most populous state with 41 million residents. It is
considered an industrial state that is well-off, although poverty and food insecurity still remain a
problem in some areas. The capital of the state is Gandhinagar and the main city is Ahmedabad, the
whole area being made up of 25 administrative districts. The earthquake in Bhuj primarily impacted
the district of Kutch, which is an arid region, with a rugged terrain that is sparsely populated.
Gujarat is a disaster-prone state subject to a host of natural hazards including cyclones,
floods, droughts, and earthquakes. In the past few years, Gujarat has experienced all of these major
types of disasters. In 1996, a flood destroyed 54,575 dwellings and killed 117 people. Two years
later, a cyclone struck the western coast, killing 3,500 people and damaging 200,000 houses. When
the earthquake hit in 2001, the state had already been experiencing a drought for over two years, one
of the worst the area had endured in recent history, which directly affected over 7,500 villages. In
general, the western part of Gujarat is an area of significant seismic activity as numerous earthquakes
have occurred over the past century. Gujarat is also prone to man-made disasters in the form of
political/civil strife. Only one year after the Gujarat Earthquake, massive riots erupted throughout
the state, mostly Hindu attacks on Muslims following a controversial train bombing in Godhara.
Thus, for Gujarat - like India as a whole - disasters are an ongoing threat to human lives and
property, posing a direct challenge to development.
Despite its high vulnerability to disasters, the state remains an economic powerhouse,
considered the second most industrialized and urbanized in India. Its key industries are textiles,
chemicals, petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, dyes, fertilizers, cement, sugar and engineering (Bhatt
2002: 2). Several entrepreneurial families come from Gujarat and there has been significant
emigration of Gujaratis to locations all over world. As the state is a forerunner in investment inflow,
there are many national and multinational corporations operating in Gujarat. The large industrial
houses in this area tend to hold significant influence locally and nationally. Home to the emergence
of the philosophies of Mahatma Gandhi, Gujarat has a long history of businesses considering their
relationships with society, as manifested in a tradition of charity and philanthropy. Mihir Bhatt, of
the Disaster Management Institute, asserts that the Gandhiji's concept of trusteeship is a popular
view of corporate relations with society, which essentially suggests that as trustees of knowledge,
skills, and wealth, each person is required to use these assets for their own needs, those of their
company, and the social/public good (2002: 12). Although the private sector has consistently been
involved in social development programs in this area, viewpoints and expressions of CSR among
companies operating in Gujarat or responding to crises there are likely to be varied and evolving in
the face of new and emerging business and social contexts.
Who Responded? Looking at the Response Phase
The magnitude of death and destruction of this natural disaster attracted substantial national,
international, and local responses from a variety of actors. As with most responses to natural
disasters in India, the government assumed a leading role in the relief efforts in Gujarat. Immediately
following the earthquake, the national government sent in the Defense Services to the area including
22,000 troops, 32 transport aircraft, 19 helicopters, and navy ships. Several companies of
paramilitary troops were also deployed for search and rescue. The Ministry of Agriculture,
responsible for relief operations at the national level, launched the National Disaster Control room
in the Department of Agriculture and Cooperation in Delhi. Government provision of resources
also included rescue workers, medical staff, heavy machinery and donations from neighboring
Indian states.
The state government, although directly impacted by the quake in the capital and other areas,
also moved in on the relief effort. The state set up a control room in the capital and an external Aid
Co-ordination Cell in Ahmedabad. The Chief Relief Coordinator was located on-site in Bhuj.
Following their work in search and rescue (SAR) activities, the state began clearing roads and debris
and restoring water and electricity. They utilized police forces as well for 'manpower', positioning
them in Bhuj and surrounding areas. Local government also played a role, but their involvement
came slower since their facilities were damaged and administrators were directly impacted. Like the
state, local government was involved in coordinating relief supplies from national and international
sources. Daily meetings were often held between local and state authorities and humanitarian NGOs
and UN agencies operating on the ground to determine priorities, identify resource needs, and
coordinate actions.
The international response was considerable in size. International NGOs and UN agencies
were involved in SAR and traditional relief activities, such as providing temporary shelter, medical
assistance, food, counseling and other necessary supplies. The international relief organizations came
from 38 countries. UNDAC recorded over 245 organizations and agencies during the relief period:
99 international NGOs, 55 national NGOs, 20 donor government teams, 10 UN agencies and 10
Red Cross organizations. The government actively supported partnerships between international and
national NGOs, which led to substantial cooperation. The UNDAC team under OCHA established
an on-site operations coordination center in Bhuj to manage international relief activities (UNDAC
2001).
As the numbers suggest, national and local NGOs were also quite active. Many strong,
active NGOs operating in Gujarat mobilized to participate in the relief activities. They had the
advantage of local knowledge, grassroots support, and existing development programs in those
areas. Among these organizations, Self-Employed Women's Association (SEWA) and a local
network of NGOs, Kutch Navnirman Abhiyan (known as Abhiyan), worked hard to foster a self-
help approach to reconstruction. These local organizations were integral to diffusing information
and assistance to local residents. Many international NGOs had existing relationships with some of
the Indian NGOs active in the response, allowing for greater cooperation (ADB/WB 2001: p.3).
Corporate involvement received little media coverage and documentation during the disaster
relief phase, aside from the adopt-a-village program that was highly publicized and then later
criticized on several levels. The private sector was not given mention in the many field reports
written by relief organizations beyond the acknowledgement that local industries donated equipment
and personnel for SAR and relief operations. The lack of information on this sector's participation is
further basis for pursuing research that provides a clearer understanding of what role corporations
are playing, their motivations, and the nature of implementation.
Recovery efforts present an opportunity for sustainable development and disaster mitigation
to take place. Following the relief phase, which lasted just over a month in most communities in
Gujarat, recovery efforts began to follow. A variety of actors were involved in these long-term
disaster rehabilitation initiatives that ranged from home-building and construction to livelihood
training and job creation. Many of these projects were primarily driven and implemented by local
and national NGOs, sometimes in collaboration with international organizations or corporate
donors. Among the corporations interviewed for this study, nearly all participated in disaster relief in
some form, while half of them took a two-phase approach and also carried out a rehabilitation
program.
The government also had numerous schemes for redevelopment of damaged areas and
compensation of victims. The state government set up the Gujarat State Disaster Management
Authority (GSDMA), headed by the Chief Minister, to handle longer-term relief and construction.
According to the GSDMA's film, "Making a Difference", the key components of the government's
rehabilitation program have been earthquake resistant reconstruction, empowerment of women,
livelihood development, agriculture restoration, public infrastructure repair, and urban planning for
disasters. Capacity-building and mitigation were new emphases of the government in rehabilitation,
as they proclaimed to embrace "preparedness as the new mantra." The agency confirms having
completed the construction of 10,000 houses in an earthquake resistant manner, the restoration of
2,000 health facilities, and the development a new district hospital in Bhuj.
Conclusion
The foregoing discussion of the responses to the Gujarat Earthquake is not intended to
function as a comprehensive assessment of the disaster but rather offer an overview of the nature of
the response and the key actors. It provides the background and broader context for evaluating the
actions of corporations responding to this particular disaster. There were many actors involved in
responding to the Gujarat earthquake, yet it is still unclear about what role the corporate sector
played and why they decided to voluntarily participate.
This gap in our knowledge of corporate actions was the basis for in-depth interviews with
companies involved in response and recovery following the earthquake. The broader context of the
other disaster actors, location and local philosophies and traditions is worth keeping in mind when
exploring these corporate actions as they were not isolated but rather part of the greater disaster
effort. The magnitude of the earthquake and the disaster prone nature of the state make the Gujarat
case a good example of corporate responses to high vulnerability communities in developing
countries.
Chapter 6
Corporate Rationale for Involvement in Response and Recovery following the
Gujarat Earthquake
Many corporations - local, national and multinational - participated in the disaster response
and/or recovery efforts following the Gujarat Earthquake in 2001, often on philanthropic or
voluntary terms. Although numerous reports on the management of this large-scale natural disaster
have emerged, there remains insufficient knowledge about why the private sector companies
participated in a non-commercial capacity. The data from in-depth interviews with 12 corporations
(six national and six multi-national) that played a significant voluntary role in disaster initiatives in
Gujarat offer a picture of the motivations of the private sector in disaster response and recovery, as
well as the enabling factors that influence the decision to participate. The comments of corporations
to some extent reflect Twigg's findings on vision and decision-making in CSR and disasters, as well
as the related ideas of CSR theorists. However, analysis of the interview data suggests a broader set
of factors underlying corporate involvement in disasters. Thus, this evaluation of corporate rationale
for participation in disaster response and recovery in the case of the Gujarat Earthquake suggests
the need for an expanded framework for understanding motivations.
Companies nearly unanimously conceded that articulating the primary motivations for their
disaster involvement was very difficult; however, there are discernible reasons why some companies
chose to participate following the Gujarat Earthquake. Outside of the hesitancy associated with
directly defining motivations, several comments emerged in the dialogue that revealed a few key
motivations for disaster involvement among companies. These corporate motivations fit within six
major categories: social values, disaster sensitivity, internal organization, external pressures, and
perceived benefits.
Social Values
The social values that a company espouses appears central to the decision to participate in
disaster response and recovery. Stated policies and articulated commitments to social and economic
development, with a view to the community as stakeholders, served as a foundation for corporate
involvement in these activities. Hence, corporate values and existing social programs facilitate a
philanthropic outlook towards natural disasters which can be understood in terms of responsibility
to community, national development interests, needs/gaps in the system, humanitarian concern, and
the social commitment of top management.
Responsibility to Community
A sense of social responsibility to community is a major motivation for corporate disaster
participation, emanating from conceptions about the role of a good corporate citizen.
Acknowledging community as stakeholders like the CSR literature proposes, companies often
expressed a particular commitment to local population. This focus appears linked to creating a
feeling of "goodwill" with the immediate community. As noted by an HCC representative (2004),
the idea of giving back to the community where you do business seems to be integrated into many
of the companies' philosophies, driving decisions about disaster participation:
When we participated in the Gujarat earthquake it was more out of social
responsibility that the company was working in the area of the quake...
HCC feels a responsibility to communities within which we operate, but presuming
we were not operating a project in Gujarat at the time we would have participated
in one way or another. We wouldn't have been able to rush in the equipment like
we had done if we were not in that region, but we could have done some sort of an
initiative like raising funds or sending some experts.
Certainly, we feel that if we are operating in an area, if we can give back or
contribute in some way, it has an effect.
Additionally, as summed up by Pfizer representative (2004), disaster involvement emanates from a
desire to project the company's commitment to community by having a positive impact through
intervention:
We are reminded in so many things about our commitment to community. Disaster
relief is one offering and we hope it remains that way. It is not one thing that one
wants to happen ever but it's more like rising to the occasion. It's about how
quickly we respond and more importantly, how we respond and in what manner we
respond. It's about whether the impact of what we did was truly beneficial to those
it was intended for.
Clearly, stakeholder theory (Carroll 1999), which suggests that community is a stakeholder, is a
driving concept in practice.
The comments of national and multinational companies also alluded to a moral
responsibility for intervention in communities in disaster situations. This sense of moral
responsibility did not appear as an exclusive motivation but rather often complemented other
notions of community commitment and organizational benefit.
Principles led our decision [to participate in the disaster relief and recovery]- a
responsibility to local population, mutual benefit, and moral responsibility. (IFFCO
2004)
The moral or ethical obligation to use company resources in ways that benefit society is a
perspective also present in the CSR literature to explain the drivers of social responsiveness (Moir
2001). The responsibility, commitment, and obligation to communities that companies cited as part
of their motivations in pursuing disaster response and recovery for the Gujarat Earthquake suggest
that an underlying desire to build their relationship with community and society is central to
corporate disaster initiatives.
National Development Interests
Corporations also participated in the Gujarat Earthquake as part of the concern expressed
for national development. This finding reflects the assertion by Snider et al.
(2003) that companies feel responsible for national interests in times of great urgency or crisis.
Companies tended to frame their involvement as a response to a situation that threatened national
vitality because of the social, economic and human costs of a large-scale natural disaster such as the
Gujarat Earthquake. Furthermore, companies viewed national health as affecting business climate
and performance, as noted by a representative of HCC (2004):
The number of disasters in India show that the country is highly vulnerable to a
variety of disasters - and their impacts are manifold on the economy of the country
and socially. Disasters, therefore, indirectly impact the vitality of the company.
Corporations viewed response and recovery as a national effort and therefore felt obliged to
contribute. They described their role in supporting national development through their business
operations and linked participation as an outgrowth of this perceived responsibility. A representative
from Ericsson (2004) commented on this point:
Ericsson is totally committed to India. Ericsson has been here for almost a
hundred years and now the company is a major player in the market for
modernizing communication systems across the country. To that extent, we
definitely feel responsible as partners in India's telecom advancement and definitely
that motivates us to participate and provide support for any such disaster.
Therefore, although corporate interventions in disasters generally happen at the community-scale,
they seem to be motivated in part by national-level concerns.
Needs/Gaps in the System
The company comments suggested that perceived needs/gaps in the response and recovery
system further stimulated them to pursue these types of disaster initiatives. The logic was based on
the idea that government and NGOs cannot meet all requirements in the wake of a disaster and that
the robust assets and resources of the private sector ought to be mobilized. A representative from
IFFCO (2004) expressed this position:
Disasters occur without notice and relief needs to be provided to the victims
immediately without any delay. Relief efforts will be effective only if provided at
the right time, which is not comparable with aid or other monetary help extended
subsequently. Assistance required in times of disasters are of great magnitude and
the government alone or the non-governmental organizations can not cope up with
the requirement. It is hence necessary that corporates who can mobilize money,
men, and materials easily respond on such occasions and that is why IFFCO
preferred to involve itself in disaster relief in a big way though it has its own
involvement in other areas of aid or development in a limited but continuous
manner.
This idea of meeting gaps is not really addressed in the CSR literature although it appears an
important motivation in the disaster context.
Tied to this outlook are company comments on the potential and desire to have a
meaningful impact on the system. The implication is that companies see themselves as playing a
valuable complementary role in disaster response and relief. They participate because their services,
technology, machinery or expertise can make a positive contribution in the disaster effort.
I think (our contribution) was unique because we were just trying to make sense
of how we could play a meaningful role there. And what we only did was
leverage on an existing experience (in masonry). In that sense, we drew on what
we had and what we had been doing (in development) for our disaster program.
(Ambuja 2004)
Firms' perceived obligation to use resources in beneficial ways to serve society is not a new concept
(Kok et al. 2001). However, it suggests that companies see space in the disaster response and
recovery system where they can make a difference through a unique contribution or augmenting
existing activities.
Humanitarian Concern
Corporate involvement in disaster response and recovery also appears to be driven by
humanitarian concern. Companies mentioned a desire to "help the needy" victims, using their
capabilities as a gesture of "compassion." Since the Gujarat Earthquake was perceived as a national
tragedy (20,000 lives were lost), several companies commented on the increased desire to contribute
because of the crisis state that prevailed. Similarly, corporate initiatives were "driven by the
immediacy and urgency of the situation," particularly in the relief or response phase. Company
comments underscored the idea that natural calamities warrant a corporate response, viewing it as a
natural progression for socially responsible organizations to get involved during disaster situations.
This finding appears to corroborate Twigg's (2002) conclusion that corporations are motivated by
altruism in the wake of disaster, showing a strong willingness to respond in a variety of ways to
emergeng type circumstances.
Social Commitment of Top Management
The decision to participate in disaster also stems from senior management's leadership in
principles and social values, just as Twigg's study concludes. Most companies in the Gujarat
Earthquake case suggested that senior management set the tone for social responsibility generally, as
well as in the specific case of disasters, as noted by HDFC (2004):
We have always been conscious about social responsibility. Our Chairman really
believes that once you are established and all, you owe it and must give back to the
society. ..
Leadership in principles has come from top management but the philosophy really
permeates the entire organization. Even employees have contributed in some way
(to disasters), whether it's a portion of their salary - whatever it is.
Nothing is imposed.
Senior company management, as arbiters of disaster policy and decision-making, are integral to
creating a corporate culture that demands a higher commitment of business to society, such as in the
case of corporate involvement in disaster response and recovery.
Disaster Sensitivity
The level of sensitivity to disasters that companies have appears to weigh into their decisions
to respond to disasters. In particular, concern about natural disasters among management, the
perceived magnitude of the disaster, a philanthropic tradition of disaster participation, the existence
of disaster policies, and the extent of the disaster's impact on business operations contribute to a
company's outlook on natural disasters. These factors impact corporate commitment to involvement
in disaster response and recovery, as demonstrated in the responses to the Gujarat Earthquake.
Concern about Natural Disasters
Similar to leadership in corporate social commitment, the decision for corporate
participation in disasters tends to emanate from a concern and sensitivity to disasters at high-level in
the company. As the CSR theory suggests, company leaders may even have a personal commitment
to the relevant issue, in this case disasters. For example, Reliance's Chairman is on the board of the
Red Cross. Other companies' leaders also exude a similar concern for natural disasters in particular,
as underscored by Ambuja and Max New York Life representatives:
We do have senior management that is extremely sensitive to natural disasters. I
mean we have always participated - whether it was the cyclone in Orissa or the
plague in Surat, we have been a part of it. And more so here where Gujarat is our
first area - we grew from Gujarat. (Ambuja 2004)
We have a board of directors who decide these sorts of things. We have
representatives from Max India. The Chief Executive Officer - Tony Singh -
personally very committed to this cause. He's serious about the company's
commitment to SOS. Even the NY contingent usually makes time to check out the
offices of SOS in Delhi. It's a fairly deep relationship. (Max NY Life 2004)
Companies cited senior management support for the cause as building morale for employees who
are actually deployed in the field for disaster operations.
In the field, we felt we were supported by the board and the members of the senior
management team. We were having personal problems - sleeping outside for days. We felt
comforted and motivated knowing that our company was behind us, that our bosses are
behind us. (Ericsson 2004)
Clearly, top management commitment was instrumental to decision-making for corporate disaster
participation in the Gujarat Earthquake.
Magnitude of the Disaster
Directly related to management's concern about disasters is the relative magnitude of the
disaster. If a disaster is perceived as being of a national magnitude, such as in the Gujarat
Earthquake case, companies believe that it is not appropriate or sufficient for the government to
tackle response and recovery without corporate intervention. Thus, the scale of the disaster is what
warrants intervention and elevates it to a nation-wide issue, as noted by a Max New York Life
Insurance representative (2004):
[The company] did not actually begin doing business until April 2001. However,
looking at the magnitude of the disaster we just had to help in the national effort at
bringing relief to the stricken people of Gujarat.
The comments of both national companies and MNCs revealed an emphasis on disaster magnitude
in their motivations.
Philanthropic Tradition of Disaster Participation
Corporate tradition in philanthropy and disasters is another feature that affects the corporate
rationale in the disaster context. Twigg's study suggests that a philanthropic tradition is an enabling
factor for corporate disaster participation. As noted by a representative from TATA (2004), a
philanthropic tradition and a history of disaster participation go hand-in-hand, strongly influencing
why corporations decided to get involved in the Gujarat Earthquake response and recovery.
Our activities come from the long-standing tradition of TATA responding to
disasters and other philanthropic efforts. There is one clear understanding - that
we cannot be seen as mere funders of a rehabilitative program. The position of the
House of TATA is to connect to issues that are important in that moment of time
- important for learning. That is the motivation. TATA has a deep commitment to
society and people are aware of this.
For those companies with strong philanthropic traditions, many described participation in the
Gujarat Earthquake disaster efforts as an embedded response or "second nature." Company
comments also revealed that the learning curve for disaster participation is rather steep and
therefore, prior experience eases the ability and increases the likelihood of a company to pursue an
engaged role in response and recovery.
Existence of Disaster Policies
Company policy also seems to play a role in decision-making about disaster participation.
Articulated disaster policies help guide management when companies are faced with decision-
making about disaster participation. As a Citigroup representative highlighted (2004):
When the earthquake was struck in Gujarat on January 26th, we were faced with the
question: What can we do there? And what I discovered as a policy is a two-pronged
approach we take to any kind of disaster relief. Aside from the community development
initiatives, we have a very clear disaster support policy globally, which I was really happy to
find. It was useful for me sitting here in this country. I didn't need to spend a lot of time in
trying to structure and figure out many things on the basic principle that we can do these
kinds of things. ..that I would be permitted to do this.
For other organizations where the policies for disaster participation are not in place, decisions about
involvement tend to be determined on an ad-hoc basis.
That's something that's not detailed in terms of corporate guidelines as far as disaster relief is
concerned. We take it on as it comes along - for example, in India for Gujarat, in New York
on September 11th. These are positions that are taken at that point in time. There are no set
policies in that we respond to all disaster relief activities. (IBM 2004)
Twigg (2002) generalized corporate efforts as predominately ad-hoc, yet this situation appears to be
changing to degree based on company comments regarding program formalization that will be
discussed later. For some companies interviewed, a history of disaster engagement seemed to serve
as a de facto disaster participation policy to guide decision-making.
Disaster Impact on Business Operations
Lastly, the extent to which companies are directly impacted by the disaster itself may also
affect their outlook on corporate involvement in response. In fact, it appears there may be
connection between corporations being directly impacted by the disaster and their decision to
launch a voluntary initiative. This influence is illustrated by IFFCO's acknowledgement that the
company commenced its relief effort while "horrifying memories of that day [were] too vivid in our
minds." Their operations were based in Kutch, near the epicenter, and suffered significant damage.
In fact, several of the companies interviewed had facilities and/or employees that were impacted by
the earthquake. Companies attended to those needs first or in parallel to their broader scale societal
efforts. Thus, direct disaster impacts on the business become a foundation for greater involvement,
although it should be noted that several companies had no direct operations in the affected area yet
also felt compelled to be involved.
Internal Organization
In their comments, companies' responses indicated that a number of internal organizational
factors directly and indirectly influenced their decisions to participate following the Gujarat
Earthquake. As Greening and Gray (1994) point out, internal organizational dynamics (as well as
external institutional pressures) help explain why corporations respond the way they do to social and
political issues. The internal organizational factors that emerged from this analysis as influential
forces in corporate decision-making and responsiveness in the disaster context are company size,
availability of resources, relevancy of business to disasters, and internal stakeholder expectations.
Company Size
One organizational factor influencing corporate decisions in disasters is company
structure/size. As Barney's resource-based view of the firm suggests, an organization's size and
capabilities will influence its social initiatives (1991). The centrality of resources emerged as an
important determinant in corporate responses to the Gujarat Earthquake. For example, TATA and
Reliance as large diversified business groups with extensive national reach, commanded a size that
enabled them to harness and source a range of resources for disaster initiatives. Other large
companies in industrial sectors that were involved in the relief operations had everything from heavy
machinery to medical services in-house to lend to the efforts. An Ambuja representative (2004)
acknowledged size as a factor, noting:
So apart from the relief distribution, we did a lot of debris clearance. We had
actually commissioned some of our large machines - our excavators. Also, being a
large corporate house we were in position to hire them out and pay for operation.
So throughout the month of February and March, this is what we did.
Thus, large-scale organizations, like all the companies researched, are able to scale and utilize their
resources in flexible ways. An understanding of what the company can offer the disaster situation
evidently influences their initial decision to get involved.
Availability of Resources
Another organizational factor is the availability of relevant resources within a company. The
presence of technical expertise, equipment and other capabilities within an organization impacts why
and how companies participate in response and recovery. For example, HCC noted that one of the
guiding principles of involvement was the availability of resources, namely construction and
demolition machinery and engineering expertise which are highly relevant to relief operations.
Companies had the ability to leverage internal resources to respond to site-specific needs. In talking
about the relief phase, a representative from Reliance (2004) noted:
Back in Bombay, we had opened a quick purchase department (in-house) which
was working around the clock. We gave them a general order to get tents, blankets,
clothes, masks. It was very cold. They worked around the clock and the supplies
started flowing.
In general, companies noted having significant technical expertise within their organizations as an
asset in their interventions.
Relevancy of Business to Disasters
Certain industries appear to have a particular synergy with disaster-related efforts by virtue
of their relevant resources. Most company comments confirmed that an engaged role in the
response phase often reflected the nature of the business. For example, Max New York Life
suggested that their involvement stemmed from the natural connection of being in the insurance
business and participating in disasters. Similarly, several companies from construction to
pharmaceuticals confirmed a synergistic link to disasters.
Being a pharmaceutical company, we have the ability to make an immediate impact
through medicines. Usually in natural disasters, people need medical assistance and
we can offer medicines... But more importantly, we look at ourselves as a
healthcare company. Our concern and interest is healthcare - so anywhere that
health becomes a major issue, we feel we can contribute [as in disasters]. (Pfizer
2004)
Communications is really so important - it is an essential building block which
could change the (disaster) scenario from a chaotic scenario to a manageable mini-
chaos... Communications is key in any disaster. (Ericsson 2004)
So to a degree, one might conclude that in many cases corporate involvement tends to be self-
selecting based on relevancy of business.
Proximity of business and access to the affected site are other organizational factors that can
drive corporate involvement in disaster initiatives. As for proximity to site, companies working
either temporarily or permanently in the vicinity of the disaster expressed an obligation to respond
because they had resources nearby. HCC (2004) notes that among its guiding principles for
involvement was "easy access to the affected area" because although they had relevant resources
internally it would not be possible to make a positive contribution unless those assets could easily be
brought to bear in the situation.
Internal Stakeholder Expectations
Corporate participation also arises from the demands of internal stakeholders. In particular,
companies cited disaster participation as a social expectation of employees.
Within our company, every one of our colleagues also wanted to do something for
it (the Gujarat Earthquake) at the time. They wanted the company to quickly
respond and do its share of good work. (Pfizer 2004)
Thus, internal pressures from employees can steer companies in a particular direction about disaster
involvement. Employees in most companies in the Gujarat Earthquake case set a strong example by
donating at least one day's salary to the company disaster relief and recovery funds and initiatives.
External Pressures
Institutional and external pressures, which often are viewed as influences on corporate
decision-making, seem relevant to corporate participation in disasters. Responses to the Gujarat
Earthquake revealed that government influence and customer expectations were substantial external
forces on companies to become involved in response and recovery.
Government Influence
In the case of the Gujarat Earthquake, the government used its influence to stimulate private
sector actors in disaster response. Government officials directly contacted some of the companies
interviewed in the immediate aftermath of the event. The government requested assistance from
some companies, particularly those with operations based in the state of Gujarat. The comments of
an Ambuja representative (2004) illustrate the role of government influence:
The immediate role we played was when we heard from the district administration.
You see, Ambuja's first plant was in Gujarat but it's miles and miles away from
Kutch. Knowing that we are a large corporate house based in Gujarat, the
Collector and other District administrators got in touch with us on the day of the
earthquake, telling us the volume of the disaster and that a lot of assistance was
needed. So, in fact the beginning of our effort occurred within 24 hours of the
earthquake. We had truckloads of relief material, a huge bunch of volunteers, and
our medical ambulances and vans and our medical doctors from our locations
immediately moved into Kutch for rescue operations.
It is unclear whether companies were committed to participation before being approached
by the government. Either way, government requests are likely to exert some pressure on companies
to become involved. Ambuja, Reliance, and IFFCO were among those contacted by the government
before initiating their operations, suggesting that the Indian government may feel more comfortable
leaning on national companies in times of disaster.
Customer Expectations
Another external pressure is the need to respond to customer expectations. Some of the
corporate disaster efforts stemmed from customer support demands because their operations or
facilities were directly affected. Ericsson's experience highlights the influence of customer
obligations on disaster participation:
In India, our customer was the one who had a network in Gujarat - we did a
disaster-recovery of the system and restored the communications network so that
was one major impact to the customers. [This] shows not just our commitment to
disaster relief but also to our customer. Customers also have a stake in restoring
order in the affected areas, being the main communication providers of mobility -
which is the right kind of technology/technique to use in these situations. So it was
a multi-pronged commitment - not just to the authorities which were involved in
relief operations but also our customer who was providing communication. (2004)
In sum, direct impacts of the disaster on customers may encourage companies to expand their
commitment to a broader-based initiative.
Organizational Benefits
Perceived organizational benefits contribute to the overall desirability of disaster
participation for companies. They are only a contributing factor because even though corporations
in the Gujarat Earthquake case acknowledged these benefits, they did not cite them as primary
motivations for disaster involvement. For some companies, organizational benefits were not
completely understood or recognized until after the company's experience in disaster response or
recovery. Although organizational benefits may not be central to company rationale in their initial
disaster response or recovery effort, they may actually serve to influence motivations for future
participation. Companies frequently cited these benefits to the organization as being intangible and
difficult to measure... "something you feel." Overall, companies viewed these positive impacts as
indirect results of disaster participation, likened to secondary spillover effects. The CSR literature
focuses heavily on these organizational aspects such as image, reputation, publicity, and trust viewing
them as fundamental to the mutual benefit that corporations perceive when they undertake socially
responsible activities or behavior. The discussion of these benefits in the Gujarat both echoes the
literature and offers insights that may apply uniquely to the India context.
Employee Benefits
Several indirect benefits to company employees are seen as emerging from corporate
participation in disaster response and recovery. Companies view employee satisfaction, loyalty to the
organization, and pride in the company as increasing as a result of corporate disaster initiatives.
Disaster participation apparently produces a "feel-good factor," because employees are proud that
the company is making an important societal contribution. The comments from IBM representative
(2004) reflect impact of disaster participation on employee morale:
We were very proud about going there. This is a normal employee's perspective.
This is the first time the country has seen such a massive calamity in our society.
The whole country was moved.
Internally, a lot of people are proud to be a part of IBM because IBM did this kind
of work for the Indian community.
Additionally, companies look at disaster participation that entails employee involvement in field
operations or secondment to NGOs as building the skills and enhancing the productivity of those
employees actively involved. An HCC representative(2004) highlighted this competency-building
dimension:
The benefits - these are emotional, the feeling you get. There is an immense
satisfaction level for those who participate directly. The character of an employee
changes - he becomes more socially aware and understands the nuances of
working at the community level. This is important because when working in more
difficult terrains, it is important to operate with sensitivity and mobilize people.
This is probably the only way you can induce this type of learning in the company.
Indirect benefits are the employee is loyal to the company. Exposure to well-
rounded development improves an employee's productivity.
Overall, companies concur on the human resource benefits that disaster initiatives achieve as good
CSR activities.
Learning and Internal Capacity-Building
Most companies saw learning and internal capacity-building benefits as emerging from
disaster involvement. Managers actively involved in developing the company's role and overseeing
their activities pointed out that they had learned a lot and that it was valuable for shaping future
disaster efforts.
It was a great learning experience for us in terms of capacity building and what we
should do in the future. Sometime we would like to document this. (HDFC 2004)
For some companies, the learning angle was actually a secondary objective of their programs, as
suggested by a TATA representative (2004):
"It was (an opportunity for) learning for us also, even though the program was
administered through NGO. The intention was not solely to monitor but to learn
about these processes. For example, we learned that if we undertake another
rehabilitation program in the future that we should not be using different
techniques than adjacent villages because of local perceptions of different types."
Thus, companies feel knowledge gained through the implementation of corporate disaster initiatives
is both valuable for shaping future disaster activities and for internal capacity-building and
coordination more generally. Although important in the Gujarat Earthquake case, learning as an
organizational benefit for improving corporate social development programs has not been strongly
emphasized in the CSR literature.
External Image, Reputation and Trust
CSR activities have been directly associated with the enhancement of company reputation,
brand and image. Twigg also discovers perceived image-building benefits to corporate participation
in disaster mitigation activities. Similarly, the companies who responded to the Gujarat Earthquake
felt there were indirect advantages for company image in their disaster activities. As noted by an
IFFCO representative (2004):
In this particular case of disaster relief work, we feel that it would have created a
place in the minds of the people for the work done by IFFCO KSF at a time of
natural calamity and would have definitely enhanced our reputation.
(In addition to our good rapport with customers and the public) the disaster relief
work would have improved our image amongst the public further.
Another dimension of image and reputation that companies emphasized was building trust, to have
the company acknowledged as a trust-worthy brand by a range of stakeholders: customers,
government and community. A Max New York Life Insurance representative (2004) emphasized the
importance of building trust as follows:
What did the company hope to gain from its participation in disaster response?
A company benefits immensely from the manner in which it operates in a
community. If it is seen as an ethical and responsible company, the positive rub off
that has on the company's overall image is immense. In the life insurance business,
trust is the key. Our policyholders commit their money to us because they see us as
financially secure and strong. Being a socially responsible company, you add to that
trust that your customers have in you.
Therefore, trust, brand and image are indirect benefits of disaster involvement that are desirable to
corporations although they do not appear to be the predominant motivation for intervention.
Business Legitimacy
Building on the trust aspect, disaster participation is also viewed as generating "good will" to
stakeholders that enhances a company's ability to do business.
We feel the returns outdo what we put in. Because we are then able to develop a
rapport, a relationship with the community which then allows us or gives us our
license- so to speak - to function and do our business in a focused manner without
bothering about the other problems. And a healthier, better quality of life right
around where we are. (Ambuja 2004)
Thus, there is a degree to which socially responsible activities such as participation in disaster
response and recovery builds public legitimacy for an organization.
Downplaying Publicity
CSR as publicity is one dimension discussed in significant depth in CSR theory. Although
company image and public perception are seen as enhanced by participation in disaster activities,
nearly all companies interviewed were adamant about not being motivated in their disaster activities
by the opportunity for publicity. In fact, most companies shunned the idea of publicizing their
effort, asserting that their actions were "not for publicity" or "marketing purposes." Most
companies "shy away from it (publicity)" (HDFC 2004), preferring to let their actions speak for
themselves. An IBM representative's (2004) comments reflected this sentiment:
Externally, we didn't publicize this - and weren't looking to reap these types of
benefits. We did it because we had the expertise. We didn't do it for publicity.
While companies conceded that "matching (external) PR with community work just doesn't
feel right" (Pfizer 2004), publicizing in internal communication materials for employee benefit was
considered important. Those companies that did not think they publicized enough cited altruistic
concerns. They noted publicity as important for motivating others (Ambuja 2004) and sharing the
learning (TATA 2004). Most publicity on the disaster initiatives that did occur for the companies
interviewed was reportedly prompted by the media outlets themselves. Several corporations (not
interviewed) were criticized in the Gujarat Earthquake for overly publicizing their intentions while
actually falling short in their delivery. Therefore, publicity may have been viewed as an avenue with
potential backlash, at least in these retrospective interview conversations.
Response vs. Recovery
Some companies participated in the response phase only, other in both response and
recovery phases. What drove their decisions to become involved at particular stages? The comments
of those companies that only actively participated in the response phase focused on competency
arguments and the perceived roles of different actors in explaining their position. A representative
from Reliance (2004) explained their position as follows:
We are not in the business of rehabilitation, just rescue and relief. We were very
clear that we were not going to be in the rehab business, at least not as a part of
this exercise. If we were, it would be a separate effort. We feel this is the
government's job not ours.
We did not want to get involved in the prefabrication of housing, figuring out
which house is good and the like. We did not want to get involved in the
commercial problems in this area. Our goal was to quickly provide relief.
In addition to our direct actions, we gave the government a $1.25m check for
rehabilitation - our corporate donation to the government to help rehabilitation
because rehabilitation is not our cup of tea. (It's) not the company's core
competency.
Additionally, companies who chose to focus solely on relief activities felt that their stated goals had
been accomplished after the initial period and that what they had to offer was most relevant to the
response phase.
Companies who focused solely on recovery or on both response and recovery initiatives felt
that it was important to be involved in recovery based on the idea they could have a more
"meaningful impact" or "role". Companies expressed an awareness and concern that participation
was very high during the response period but then drastically reduces as the affected area moves into
recovery mode. Pfizer reflected this concern, stating:
Sympathy for victims is highest right after the event occurs but a week later, a
month later, people have gone back to their normal lives and they don't get media
attention anymore. That's the time that the reality hits them very bad. When they
are shell-shocked in the first few days they may not even feel hunger only grief and
shock, but it's later they will be cold, homeless, hungry and desolate. And that's
usually the point where relief tapers off and people who feel they have done their
bit by rushing in blankets. But what happens to these people? Unfortunately... the
ability of the government to step in and provide shelters and homes and sustainable
rehab work is not really high. And hence, we feel that this is an area where we can
have more of a meaningful impact on their lives in getting them back as normal
productive citizens. This is not a unique thing. Many organizations have similar
thoughts in this area. (Pfizer)
An interest in pursuing more sustainable development policies also made recovery programs
attractive to companies. Companies made the link between how their disaster recovery programs
served as mitigation strategies as well, building the capacity of the affected population to deal with
future calamities.
Conclusion
The companies interviewed for this research defined their initiatives in disaster response and
recovery following the Gujarat Earthquake as flowing from a sense of corporate social
responsibility. Understanding why corporations participate in disasters involves not only looking at
the direct company motivations but also the more indirect factors that influence the capacity of
companies to respond, the organizational benefits of participating, and how disaster decisions are
reached. Thus, corporate rationale for participation in disaster response and recovery can be
understood in terms of social values, disaster sensitivity, internal organization, external pressures,
and perceived benefits.
A summary of the factors influencing corporate participation in disaster response and
recovery in the case of the Gujarat Earthquake is provided in Table 6.1. Both national and
Corporate Rationale for Disaster Responrse and Recovery
Responsibility to High-level Concern Company Size Government Positive External
Community for Natural Disasters Influence Image and Reputation
Concern for Magnitude of Disaster Availability of Customer Trust in
National (national-scale) Resources Expectations Brand/Company
Development
Philanthropic Relevancy of Benefits to Employee
Needs/Gaps in the Tradition in Disaster Business to Morale, Productivity,
System Participation Disasters Loyalty, and Skills
Humanitarian Company Disaster Employee Internal Learning and
Concern Policy Expectations Capacity-building
Social Commitment Direct Disaster Impact Business Legitimacy
of Top-Management on Business
Table 6.1: Summary of the Factors behind why Corporations Participate in Disaster Response and Recovery
multinational corporations expressed similar sentiments and as such, the table summarizes overall
factors without differentiating by company type. One major difference between national and
multinational corporations that did surface was the extent of government influence on corporate
involvement in disaster response and recovery, as it was a more significant pressure on national
companies. The extent and efficacy of this pressure is likely to vary according to the institutional
context of a country and the type of company (national vs. multinational) involved.
In general, natural disasters emerged as an important arena for corporate action due to
corporate sensitivity to this issue. It appears that social values were critical to driving corporate
involvement in response and recovery. Among the principal social values, the desire to fill
needs/gaps in the system is one that has not been generally recognized among CSR theorists. CSR
theorists focus predominately on internal organizational benefits as driving forces for socially
responsible behavior, but for the companies interviewed these benefits were considered influential,
but secondary to their efforts. These motivating factors and influences help explain what CSR means
in the context of disaster participation, albeit from an Indian perspective. Since the ultimate goal of
disaster management is to reduce suffering and vulnerability, as discussed in Chapter 8, can be used
to guide the formulation of policy and incentives to direct and nurture a corporate role in disaster
participation.
Chapter 7
Corporate Roles and Implementation in Response and Recovery following the
Gujarat Earthquake
The previous chapter looked at corporate motivations for voluntary or philanthropic
participation in disaster response and recovery. To gain a complete picture it is also important to
consider corporate roles and implementation in response and recovery. Traditionally, private sector
roles in disaster management were limited to charitable donations to emergency funds and in-kind
donations during the relief phase. Even Twigg's (2002) study notes that corporate activity in disaster
relief is often short-term and revolves around financial contributions or in-kind donations of relief
goods, provision of transport and communication facilities. However, investigating the nature and
implementation of corporate disaster initiatives is important because as the Gujarat Earthquake case
indicates some corporations appear to actually be doing more, and on philanthropic or non-
commercial terms. They are actively engaged in the field in both response and recovery and they are
deploying their employees, expertise and machinery in ways they believe are providing a meaningful
impact on disaster-affected populations. Thus, the corporate responses to the Gujarat Earthquake
provide insight into the innovative roles that corporations are playing and an understanding of how
they are being implemented.
Implementation Philosophy
Before looking at the specific roles that companies played in disaster response and recovery
initiatives following the Gujarat Earthquake, it is first necessary to explore companies'
implementation philosophy in disaster initiatives regarding their approaches to determining type of
participation and meeting resource needs and field demands. Thus, implementation philosophy can
be understood in terms of community engagement, leveraging and provisioning of resources, and
implementation context.
Community Engagement
Community engagement emerged as the preferred way to approach disaster initiatives, at
least in company rhetoric. Comments regarding the company's role in disaster response and
recovery appeared to be grounded in the principle that they wanted to provide more than monetary
contributions, and favored playing a direct, applied role. The majority of the companies
interviewed viewed their company's role as going beyond charity. Companies related their preference
for an engaged role with the opportunity to ensure that the materials and services being provided
actually reach the intended beneficiaries. Therefore, companies take an active role in response and
recovery to guarantee that things happen as envisioned, as suggested by a Reliance representative
(2004):
We had our own rules. Our rules were that we are not here for charity but for relief
and rescue- not to give a few million dollars and go. Don't tell me give me some
blankets and leave. No, I want to make sure the blankets reach the right guys. You
tell me who the right people are. So, they (the government) would tell me where to
target. In these kinds of situations, without coordination there is a lot of
duplication.
Companies acknowledged that "checkbook philanthropy" is an easier response to disasters
but they would rather play a role that allows them to see the project through to completion.
Companies feel they can also gain from the process of more active engagement with beneficiaries,
by achieving some indirect organizational benefits like enhanced image, reputation and learning. An
HDFC representative (2004) highlighted this view as follows:
What our company has done is not just provide funding although just giving a
check would be easier. We want our own involvement - the reason being it gives us
an opportunity to ensure that the funds have been utilized for the purposes stated,
that is, reaching out to the beneficiaries. And you learn something in the process.
Another reason most companies were "keen to play not just a donor role" (TATA 2004) and
preferred to undertake their own programs was an awareness that the company has assets to offer
response or recovery initiatives that can complement other actors or partners in the field. As a
Pfizer representative (2004) noted:
You're more engaged because you've got skills to offer that complement other
actors in the field. In fact, what we did and what we usually do when we get
involved in community initiatives, we just don't just identify a project and then give
away money. We work with the NGO in designing the project intervention because
very often we have some skills in-house because we have a very strong medical
team and fortunately they are as oriented towards community initiatives as the rest
of us, more specifically those who have some responsibility for that. So in
designing what this hospital would do, we worked with Help Age so it wasn't as if
there was a plan somebody brought to us but we actually developed a plan for what
this institution should be when it is set up.
In addition to the outlook that corporations should play a more active role was the related
expectation of greater engagement for partners and beneficiaries. Particularly for recovery initiatives,
companies expressed the desire to involve beneficiaries in capacity-building, with a "philosophy of
hand-up, not hand-out" (Citigroup 2004).
Leveraging and Provisioning of Resources
Disaster relief and recovery efforts require extensive procurement of relevant resources. The
corporations involved in the Gujarat Earthquake were able to leverage their internal resources to
meet demands in the field in terms of expertise, machinery, technology, materials, and labor. As
large-scale organizations, many companies commented on their abilities to tap into a wide range of
resources, particularly in response efforts where activities spanned debris removal to ration
distribution. The diversified business groups interviewed, TATA and Reliance, illustrated the rich
variety of assets that they had the ability to source in the emergency response period by leveraging a
range of resources across companies.
TATA has over 82 companies - an over 50,000 crore (an Indian currency measure)
empire. There's a TATA Steel, TATA Motors, TATA Power and several other
companies, each specializing in a separate area. The second donation in-kind which
is possible is a central policy whereby each of these companies will give some
equipment which will help in the rehabilitation program. For example, immediately
if the power infrastructure is devastated, you'll need generators and vital assistance.
Through TATA Power and our cellular outfits, delivering this equipment and
installing it is possible. If vehicles are required, we can look to TATA Motors. If
cooks are necessary, we look to TATA's hotel chains.
At the company level, resources are donated in terms of machinery and employees
volunteer their expertise. We draw on the core capabilities to provide immediate
relief. (TATA 2004)
In some cases, existing technical expertise helps drive the shape and type of recovery
intervention or program. For example, Ambuja cement drew on their masonry knowledge to
develop a livelihood-training recovery program with mitigation implications.
We as a company have a lot of technical expertise within and we've tried that out in
the larger cities like Bombay and Ahmedabad where we've actually been doing
Mason training conference, that is getting masons together and giving them better
technical inputs on how to build, how to construct houses. And we thought we
could leverage on that experience that we had and get on with reconstruction in
Kutch. So, with that part in mind we actually put together a module. (Ambuja
2004)
In general, company activities suggest the tendency to develop interventions that reflect core
capabilities. Construction companies (HCC, Reliance has one) utilized not only their heavy
equipment but also brought operators and engineers on site to manage activities. Similarly,
interventions drew on industry strengths: IBM focused on IT capabilities, Ericsson on
communications issues, and Pfizer on healthcare. By focusing on core competencies, companies
were able to offer their skills and not just in-kind donations.
In addition to in-house assets, companies were able to utilize resources channeled to them
through their affiliates, subsidiaries, partners, and international counterparts. Companies with prior
disaster experience felt they had earned recognition as trusted sources for distribution of such
external resources. TATA and HDFC representatives highlighted the role that they played as a
conduit for outside resources as follows:
Most companies have international collaborators during the relief phase. Now most
of these collaborators - TATA has a reputation among industrial houses for being a
very honest one - so many players who wanted to contribute found it appropriate
to route their resources through the House of TATA. They would send us clothes,
toys, bags. These were from international donors- those companies who
collaborate with the companies of the House of TATA. They wanted to do
something and decided to do it through us. (TATA 2004)
At the same time, KFW which had been our partner in these types of (disaster)
initiatives had a special grant. They said, "we would like you to guide us" and put
that amount at our disposal. (HDFC 2004)
Some multinational companies also received technical assistance from their existing global disaster
programs (Ericsson, GM, and IBM).
We had our disaster management competency team from the US. There were two
gentlemen who had come to help us. Our team from the US had brought the
software that could develop a whole inventory management system but our team
had made some modifications on that. So, we got help from outside but also
utilized local skills. (IBM 2004)
Overall, the ability to leverage internal and international resources was integral to corporate
initiatives, particularly in the response phase.
Funding for corporate disaster initiatives appears to be derived from a number of sources. In
the Gujarat Earthquake case, funding tended to be a mix of company-level contributions,
foundation grants and employee donations, as well as special disaster funds and donations from
international counterparts. Partnership-schemes, such as those with the government, also offered
matching contributions. Customers as donors seemed a fairly untapped funding market, as one
could imagine, for example, the creation of affinity products where a percentage of proceeds would
go to company disaster efforts. Employee donations, however, were a notable portion of funding
for Gujarat disaster initiatives. In most companies, at least one day's salary was donated voluntarily
by all employees and in some cases, as many as 3-5 days' salary. Employee contributions appeared
standardized, suggesting it is likely to be an Indian norm in disaster situations. Employee funds were
nearly always matched or doubled with company funds.
In general, corporations pointed out that their efforts were not significantly hindered by
resource/funding constraints. Because of organization size and commitment, some companies
suggested that ample funding was available for disasters. As a Reliance representative (2004) noted:
The community respected us - they saw us as saviors. We were delivering. We
have deep pockets and we allowed them to run deep. This was one project in my
corporate experience were there was no budget. We were just told to do what
needs to be done. That's it.
Companies like Citigroup also claimed that they "had money pouring in" from different sources.
Since funding was not perceived as a major limitation for most organizations, it may imply that
private sector disaster initiatives have greater flexibility in approach and timeline.
Implementation Context
The implementation context that corporations encounter in disaster situations seems to
impact the nature of the programs they pursue. Obviously, the type of disaster affects the character
of a corporate initiative and in the case of the companies responding to the Gujarat Earthquake, the
range of possible avenues should be similar to other post-earthquake disaster situations.
Additionally, the magnitude of the disaster was something that corporations cited as affecting both
the amount of resources mobilized and the approach that they took. In fact, A representative from
General Motors (2004) noted that the company "decide(s) strategy based on magnitude of the
disaster." According to the comments of companies, resource mobilization and the nature of an
initiative also seem to depend on what other actors are doing and what the perceived needs are.
The situation in the field influences the character of a corporate disaster effort and where the
initiative is carried out. Government and civil society actors tend to be in communication with
private sector actors on the ground to help ensure that relief gets to the locations where it may be
lacking. Like other companies, Pfizer emphasized that circumstances in the field "shaped our
decision" about how to move forward.
Response Roles and Implementation
Disaster response refers to the actions taken after the disaster, particularly the immediate
relief efforts which are aimed at assessing needs, reduce, suffering, limiting the spread and
consequences of the disaster, and laying groundwork for rehabilitation (WHO, 2002). Unlike
recovery, response deals with the emergency aspects of the disaster in the first days and weeks
following the disaster, with response interventions typically being temporary in nature. An analysis
of the roles corporations are playing is essential to understand what relief actions companies are
taking on a voluntary basis and how they are being implemented.
Types of Response Intervention
All but one national company included in this research, five out of six, carried out large-scale
relief efforts in the disaster response phase and only national companies (no multinational
companies) had relief efforts of such a substantial size. Their activities included search and rescue
operations, debris clearance, distribution of relief materials, food and temporary shelters, provision
of emergency medical services, transportation of goods, and setting up relief camps. In this capacity,
companies mobilized significant resources for their response effort such as heavy machinery for
construction and demolition, vehicles for transport, communications equipment and relevant relief
materials such as tents, blankets, and masks. They also deployed employees in the field - technical
experts, skilled operators, and medical staff. The lists drawn out by IFFCO and HCC regarding their
contributions during the response phase, as displayed in Appendix D, illustrate some of the roles
that these national companies played in terms of resource mobilization and executing standard relief
functions.
Site selection for intervention varied from concentration on one village to a focus on several;
however, companies tended to decide on location based on guidance from the government and
other actors about where the gaps and needs were geographically. Most companies created ad-hoc
field offices to use as a base to coordinate and manage their operations. Their engagement in
response activities lasted in the range of just under one month to six months, averaging closer to the
former.
To an extent, the ability to undertake a sizeable response initiative may be reflective of the
capabilities of these companies as industrial players with technical know-how and capital
(construction, cement, fertilizer and diversified businesses). Although companies did not cite major
resource constraints, some companies noted that diverting machinery, services or personnel from a
project for disaster response efforts did require getting permission or an extension from clients and
partners.
In addition to the large scale relief efforts of national companies, the private sector also
played other roles during the response period. Some companies focused on interventions that solely
reflected their core technical capabilities such as building an IT infrastructure for disaster response
logistics (IBM) and improving the communications network - restoring cellular and radio outlets
and distributing communications devices to NGOs (Ericsson). Another organization was involved
in collecting in-kind donations and relief distribution, but without the deployment of heavy
machinery on which national companies focused (Pfizer). Other companies viewed their role during
the response period as mobilizer of funds, donating to the government relief fund or an NGO with
whom they had an existing relationship (Citigroup, Max New York Life, and General Motors).
Employee Participation
Employee participation was noteworthy in corporate disaster response efforts, diverting
personnel from traditional business operations. Workers deployed in the field for emergency
response varied from skilled laborers and operators to regular workers doing relief distribution.
Particularly relevant to the response initiatives were personnel specializing in logistics, engineering,
construction, and medicine. There appeared to be a significant degree of autonomy for managers in
the field although they usually provided frequent feedback to the company. In some cases, large
numbers of people were mobilized. Reliance had some 700 employees deployed at one point,
although other corporate initiatives generally appeared to be in the 25-95 person range. Employees
usually carried out this role in place of their regular job but remained fully paid, working in the
disaster context on voluntary/optional basis. Employees were sourced from all over the country and
reflected the full spectrum of management levels, as Ambuja's experience illustrates:
The 90-95 (employee) volunteers from Gujarat were there (in the field) for the
entire month and they were all employees of the company at all levels. We had
people who were officers. We had people who were directing the show. We had a
company director, workers from the packing plant, (and workers) from our
canteens. Anybody who volunteered to go, went.
In terms of skilled labor, the machinery would require an operator, a supervisor,
and an engineer to oversee debris clearing. In the community kitchens, it was
mostly the workers cooking and serving. Also, distribution of the tents and
blankets. (Ambuja 2004)
Many companies rotated employee groups in the field because of the severe conditions, keeping the
number of people deployed constant but changing actual employees.
Government Role in Response
All corporate efforts in disaster response in the Gujarat Earthquake case were implemented
unilaterally although each company acknowledged having a close working relationship with the
government during that period. Although they had not "partnered" with the government, they did
have significant communication with and guidance from the authorities. Both national and
multinational companies were in close contact with the government if they were executing
operations in the field. Given the pervasiveness of this relationship, it appears fair to conclude from
company comments that this interaction is a matter of protocol in the India context. As HCC notes:
My understanding is that the Project Manager on-site was coordinating with the
Administrator Officer from the Government side. It's normally the block
development officer and the Collector (district). You have to report to the collector
who then deploys you to the necessary spot. The collector in fact has the authority
to take over any equipment, any machine, any land, any property with the
understanding that help must be given to the necessary people. So, we basically
informed them of the machinery and expertise we had available so that they could
direct us to a site. (HCC)
Government communication appears to have been regularized to some extent through regular
meeting times or designated liaisons. Companies suggested that the government was able to
influence the nature of their initiatives based on any requests they might make.
There was a lot of communication with the government. There was a specific
group handling that - a core liaison group who would do all the interacting in
Ahmedabad. We had a system in place - our communication had failed at least for
the first few days. So we had stationed at our campsite a few mobile phones.
Converge a few times of day. To report back to Ahmedabad, Bombay, and Gujarat
headquarters because this was the only communication available for a while. So if
the government wanted something specific, or if the site people thought something
was required - the liaison officers in Ahmedabad had to work that out. (Ambuja
2004)
Furthermore, active corporate response programs appear to have been adapted according to
government requirements, as suggested by the comments of an IBM representative (2004):
So what we did initially was create a plan on how we could get the whole (logistics)
system to work. When we were doing this, we were keeping the person who was in
charge of the whole relief operation in Gujarat in close links with them
(government officials) to understand what their needs are and basically adapting
solutions to their needs.
Although direction predominately came from the government, companies did coordinate with other
actors in the field during the response period. As an HCC representative (2004) highlighted:
Our effort was a coordinated activity though - worked with local level NGOs,
volunteers, and villagers as well as the Collectorate.
Despite the government's role in directing corporate response initiatives, several comments
from companies suggested that the government was not entirely competent in their emergency
management role and lacked leadership and coordination in the early stages. Companies noted the
"chaos" during the response period. One positive aspect of government guidance was that
participating companies were acting unilaterally and as such, it was important to have a body
centrally keeping track, preventing duplication, and sending resources in the needed direction. Based
on the central role of government in Indian disaster response operations, it appears they have the
potential to play an oversight role to make sure corporations are behaving in an appropriate manner,
since they are not disaster professionals and may not be aware of the sensitivities and protocols in
emergency circumstances.
Committee Formation
Some companies chose to design and implement programs through committee formation.
Committees were volunteer management groups that cut across areas (or companies) to handle
corporate disaster activities. In the case of TATA, this committee saw through the initiative from the
response period to the end of the recovery phase nearly 2.5 years later. Committees such as this
serve as a decision-making and oversight body for field activities. Employees on these committees
tended to play dual roles, attending to regular job functions in addition to disaster-oriented
responsibilities. Twigg (2002) also commented on the phenomenon of committee-formation in the
corporate efforts in disaster mitigation and suggests it is an organizational behavior that corporations
employ as an adaptation to handle philanthropic efforts with regular business staff.
There is a central group which actually coordinates all the initiatives. It requires two
kinds of people. One which can regularly run to the field to represent TATA in
providing relief such as blankets, tarpaulin, etc.; After the initial relief period is
over, then whether or not things like housing or other livelihood issues, or things
like livestock and agriculture are a problem, a long-term rehabilitation program is
devised. So it has two responsibilities: one is immediately administering a relief
effort and two is being there on a long-term basis. (TATA 2004)
This finding ties into the types of employee participation occurring in disaster initiatives which is
explained in both the relief and recovery contexts.
Recovery Roles and Implementation
Companies interviewed for this research also played a role during the recovery phase of the
Gujarat Earthquake. Unlike the emergency activities of disaster response, recovery refers to
rehabilitation and reconstruction initiatives that deal with the long-term needs of communities
following disasters, namely the restoration of social functions, economic activities, and physical
structures (WHO, 2002). Recovery also implies the introduction of prevention or mitigation
measures that reduce the vulnerability of the affected population to future disasters. An analysis of
corporate recovery roles in the case of the Gujarat Earthquake reveals the priorities and approaches
of companies to long-term disaster rehabilitation in vulnerable communities.
Types of Recovery Initiatives
Half of the companies interviewed designed and implemented some form of recovery
"program" for the affected population, focused on the community-scale.3 These recovery imitiatives
were viewed as entirely separate from relief efforts, beginning after the recovery phase was
completed. Some organizations did, however, use their relief activities as an opportunity to gather
information about potential beneficiaries, assess what needs existed and design recovery programs
that would be most relevant and meaningful.
The nature of programs was diverse and reflected both the long-term needs in earthquake-
stricken communities and often the competencies and concerns of companies. Housing
reconstruction was the most common type of program wherein companies built housing units for
disaster victims that would meet their needs for shelter while decreasing disaster vulnerability
through more seismic-resistant construction (TATA, HDFC, IFFCO). These housing programs also
involved the community in learning about safer construction methods, suggesting that recovery
projects really can serve mitigation objectives. Another mitigation-oriented recovery program was a
mason training and certification module that Ambuja carried out in numerous villages. In line with
their interest in healthcare issues, Pfizer's recovery program surrounded construction of a
community hospital in Kutch (Pfizer), while Citigroup supported micro-credit schemes and the
construction of a community center (Citigroup).
Unlike the uniformly unilateral approach to disaster response work, companies systematically
engaged in formal partnerships with NGOs or the government to carry out recovery plans.
Recovery programs were longer-term with engagement generally lasting an average of two years.
Even where the government was not a formal partner, they tried to push corporate resources in
specific directions and influence program design with varying degrees of success. It appears that
companies learned from past experiences in recovery initiatives which helped to shape and influence
3 In addition, there was also one company which did not pursue their own recovery initiative in the field but instead
gave a large monetary donation to the government's rehabilitation fund. The decision reflected their core
competency was not in social initiatives, stating that recovery was the role of government not corporations.
the roles they decided to pursue in the recovery phase for the Gujarat Earthquake. Employee
participation was also vital to recovery programs, with those volunteers commonly playing dual roles
between their regular job duties and their responsibilities for recovery programs, although
sometimes employees were seconded to field operations for periods.
Partnerships
Partnership formation was fundamental to recovery initiatives. This collaborative model is
what Twigg (2002) and others suggest is the new paradigm in disaster management. Partnerships
were absent even from the relief initiatives of the companies engaged in collaborative recovery
programs, suggesting that the nature of recovery being longer-term, less top-down and more
grassroots-based in its implementation better lends itself to partnerships. However, very little is
understood about how these partnerships actually work in practice. Analyzing the partnerships for
recovery programs in the Gujarat Earthquake case provides some insight into why corporations
engage in partnerships, the criteria used for evaluating partners, and what roles companies and their
partners are each playing within these collaborative efforts.
There are several reasons why corporations sought partnerships with NGOs for recovery
efforts. Since recovery programs were implemented at the community-level, connecting with an
NGO provides a liaison to community. Corporations do not view themselves as having the expertise
in community development and social initiatives whereas that tends to be a core competency of
NGOs engaged in disaster management work. Representatives of TATA and Ambuja commented
on the complementary strengths of NGOS, stating:
The Trust was emphatic in saying (to the disaster committee) "you must associate
with a local non-governmental organization. They will give you valuable advice.
They will give you genuine data and they will also give you a system whereby you
can interconnect with the community." (TATA 2004)
Frankly, in our case I don't think we could have done it any other way because we
had the technical expertise to do the mason training but we didn't have the person-
power to get the 20-30 people together, to motivate them to take the course, we
definitely needed people there at the grassroots doing things for us and I don't
think there is any other way we could have offered so many perspective trainees
together. I think that partnerships are essential and there really isn't any other way
of doing it. (Ambuja 2004)
NGOs are perceived as valuable partners because they have information and knowledge on the
community and issues at hand so that they can help guide the design and development of a recovery
program.
The principles we wanted to work with were not narrow, we had faith in their (our
NGO partner's) assessment. That's how we approach partnerships - we don't have
the expertise in judging the grassroots requirements, but they do. So we actively
adopted it (their suggested approach). (Citigroup 2004)
On another level, given the long-term nature of recovery programs corporations do face
business constraints on the employees' time and deliverables. Therefore, they cannot support going
into a recovery program. NGO partners can provide the needed resources and personnel to
successfully administer a program. As a Pfizer representative (2004) suggested:
Corporates, even those like us focused on social initiatives, do not have an
organizational structure that supports social initiatives as it does its business
activities. We could put more resources into social responsibility but we know that
is not what we do best. That is not the main objective behind which this whole
organization was set up. So while we try to stay focused on our objectives, social
initiatives are an integral part of the conscience of that business. We are good at
raising resources internally and tapping into resources from the foundation, or
resources in terms of networking with other organizations which we can do. If it's
for a specific service, we can call in that specific expertise. Beyond that, we don't
have the people, the hands to work on it - that is where we need an NGO.
Except for IFFCO which did partner with the government, most companies felt that partnering
with the government was more bureaucratic, less flexible and required greater action on the part of
the corporation. Given the way government collaboration was perceived, NGOs presented the
"only viable partnership option" (Pfizer 2004).
The corporations engaged in disaster recovery programs had clear conceptions about what
characteristics were necessary in an NGO partner They needed to feel comfortable with how the
NGO operated, often from the perspective of past experience working together. In fact, most
companies chose partners with whom they had an existing relationship. Working knowledge of the
affected area and earned credibility were also considered essential. An HDFC representative (2004)
pointed out these aspects:
And the comfort with the NGOs was important to us because if we had gone in
directly, we couldn't have done much. Not on the scale of 7,000-10,000 (housing)
units. We had developed relationships with these NGOS - they had developed
credibility, for us credibility was very important. Therefore, there is one NGO (you
must have heard of it) SEWA that we were working with. We have been working
with them for a long time. So for this earthquake, SEWA and HDFC came
together. SEWA other funding also - they have a number of programs but the
major one was with HDFC. The comfort level was very high - they have reach,
they had been working there, most of them are women, many of them had been
their members.
Other characteristics that were frequently mentioned as being important for NGO partners was the
prominence of the organization, their commitment to the cause, reliability, good governance, and
professionalism.
We know that Help Age is a very reliable and credible organization, something
essential to establish at times like these. You have mushrooming organizations, all
claiming to do a good job, but how do you measure this. They all probably have
good intentions. So, we had had confidence in Help Age. They are organized and
have systems in place to ensure that whatever intended assistance will actually get
there. (Pfizer 2004)
Partnership Roles
Companies were quick to point out that their role in the partnership for the recovery
programs exceeded financing. Their key activities were described as designing the recovery
program, monitor activity and progress, lending technical expertise, providing training, adapting
program and capturing the learning process, many of these functions being done in conjunction with
their NGO partners. Companies also commented on the assistance in skills and capacity-building
they provided for their NGO partners where relevant. An HDFC representative (2004) described
these dimensions as follows:
They (NGOs) can take us there - we participate, we monitor, we do a lot of things.
We help the NGOs in capacity building when it is IT -related and computer-
related. Not just technical skills but try to assist in whatever is required beyond
finance.
Let us understand that the NGO's expertise is not as contractors. They don't have
expertise in constructing houses but they have been there (in the community) and
we need to support them. We need to help them get a good technical team in place,
pay for good engineers, and look into their administrative capacity and what ways
they can build up this.
In this regard, Citigroup actually had professional development sessions - skills seminars in
leadership, persuasion, negotiation - for their NGO partners adapted from their internal training
programs. This reciprocity is often based on the value to the long-term relationship between parties.
Companies sometimes played a mediating role between partners when working with several NGOs
at once. In one case, the company's role was to draw on the company's technical expertise and
seconding company engineers to a mason-training program that was carried out in concert with
different NGO partners.
The role for companies appeared most intensive partnering with the government in their
reconstruction schemes. IFFCO, which chose this partnership path, noted that the company group
or committee overseeing the initiative was essentially "acting almost as an NGO in the field," as they
were directly involved in all facets of implementation. This dedicated group was made up of regular
employees, who were working in addition to their regular jobs.
The partnering NGOs were predominately focused on implementation on the ground. The
NGOs played a valuable role in information-gathering and identification of desired
participants/beneficiaries. NGOs were instrumental in communicating to and mobilizing
community members, as an Ambuja representative (2004) cites:
We got NGOs to put together groups of 20-25 young people who would want to
take training as masons. So, here we were not trying out people who had already
worked as masons, we were trying out pure laborers or people who had lost
everything and wanted to get on with some type of livelihood and train as masons
and in turn, be a part of the reconstruction process.
These NGOs remained deployed in the field on an ongoing basis whereas company employees
tended to make more intermittent visits to project sites. Sometimes, the actual partnership was with
a national-level or international organization, which in turn, partnered with a local or affiliate NGO.
In this case the direct NGO partner, like the company, played more of a governance and oversight
role. Although there is some mutual suspicion at first between corporation and NGOs, it appears
that working relationships tend to dissolve this, underscoring the value of long-term relationships.
Community
There has been strong criticism of corporations as being top-down in their disaster efforts, a
finding Twigg also confirmed in his study of CSR and disaster mitigation. The lack of community
participation in corporate initiatives appears true for the role they are playing in disaster response
but not in recovery. For the recovery programs following the Gujarat Earthquake, corporations
essentially felt that community participation was important not only as a principle in social
development initiatives generally but indispensable to achieving program success from a beneficiary
perspective. Community participation was viewed as vital to ensuring that program deliverables
actually met local needs and that communities felt a stake in the process. Some of the logic that
companies expressed in their adoption of stakeholder participation stems from their past
experiences where recovery programs without participation were less effective. In several instances,
a participatory, bottom-up approach was part of the partnering NGO's philosophy. There was an
acknowledgement, however, that a real, in-depth concentration on community participation did
sometimes have its tradeoffs in efficiency.
Additionally, an understanding of the community was necessary for identification of
beneficiaries. This is an area where NGOs were particularly helpful to companies who did not have
the local knowledge to determine the appropriate beneficiaries. In their recovery programs,
companies expressed a desire to target the "most needy" populations and to reach those individuals
who would not be served through government schemes or other programs. In one case, an
understanding of local dynamics in the community revealed that the Muslim population was being
underserved by recovery programs in the area. In response, the company chose to deliberately
designate half the housing units in the program for Muslims in the village. Thus, community
knowledge and participation is essential to recovery programs in terms of public perception, local
relevancy of interventions, and targeting of the appropriate beneficiaries.
Formalization
Formalization of corporate disaster programs and initiatives arose in the aftermath of the
Gujarat Earthquake. Formalization or institutionalization of disaster efforts only occurred among
national companies (and nearly all of them: 5 out of 6) with four being relief-oriented programs and
one recovery. Prompting the creation of formal, ongoing programs based on the corporate
interventions in the Gujarat Earthquake was the idea that companies could tap into resources better
if the resources are lined up or dedicated in advance, employees are trained and policies are
articulated and well-known. Formalization can be understood as an organizational adaptation or
institutional response to accommodate the emerging role that corporations are playing in disaster
response and recovery. Although all the institutional responses were among national companies,
they are pursuing formalization independently, generally led by the vision and commitment to
disasters of top management. The impetus to formalize their responses is probably attributable in
part to the fact the Gujarat Earthquake represented the largest scale disaster mobilization any of
those companies had pursued. Formalization offers ways to improve mobilization and preparedness
for future disasters, as TATA and Reliance representatives noted:
There is a superb amount of resources available in house which unfortunately we
were not able to tap completely. But now the inventory we are creating we will
understand what resources each company has to offer. Then we will be able to
match resources with specific requests so that technical and manpower resources
that can be mobilized in case of disaster. (TATA 2004)
The vision is very clear - we want to have a rapid task force. At that time we only
operated in certain areas (like Gujarat) and now we are a pan-Indian company. We
have come a long way.
(There is) intent and assurance that the company will develop a rapid task force to
respond to disasters and we are working very closely with the government
organizations on shaping that vision. (Reliance 2004)
Another institutional mechanism created was an ongoing relief fund (IFFCO), contributed to by
employees and the company, to ensure resources for major responses to future disasters.
Kisan Sewa Fund has contributed significantly in the reconstruction and
rehabilitation of earthquake affected villages of Gujarat. It will continue to strive
hard in meeting its objective of providing assistance to the victims of natural
calamity that may occur in future anywhere in the country. We reiterate our
commitment to the cause of the people, and shall continue to do so, particularly at
times of crisis. (IFFCO 2004)
Although most of these companies are taking independent steps to strengthen disaster response or
recovery, HCC is looking to be an industry leader by promoting collaboration within the
engineering, construction, logistics and transportation sectors through membership in the Disaster
Resource Network (DRN) - India, aimed at improving the dedication and mobilization of resources
in future disaster response situations.
HCC only takes mid-sized contracts so a lot of the company's work is done in
remote areas. There is an informal system or a trust that given about creating an
awareness with these project teams about how to sustain yourself and the risks you
must be aware of. We have a training department that provides a lot of input in this
area - sustaining yourself, safety measures, these things. Which in turn have helped
guide employees in disaster situations but in terms of - but in terms of procedures
and formalities - there was none. But the knowledge was therewith people on how
they should actually behave under the circumstances. Who do you report to? How
do you work? How does each member of the team contribute? - that did not come
until after and has become clearer even with the formation of the DRN. (HCC
2004)
Furthermore, the replicability and sustainability of disaster response and recovery models was
perceived as an important stimulus for formalization of disaster programs and policies.
Conclusion
The private sector voluntarily participated in response and recovery following the Gujarat
Earthquake in a significant way. This finding is suggestive of the fact that some corporations in
general may be playing a more engaged role in disaster efforts in developing countries. An in-depth
look at the actions and approaches of national and multinational corporations in Gujarat provides a
sense of how these initiatives are actually being implemented in the field. It appears that companies
approached their disaster activities with an implementation philosophy that surrounded the
principles of playing a more engaged role in community, leveraging company resources and expertise
to meet on-site demands, and adapting to the implementation context in the field.
Corporations played a significant role in disaster response to the Gujarat Earthquake as
summarized in Table 7.1, with examples of types of interventions and mobilization of core
competencies. Response activities refer to those emergency activities that happen in the immediate
wake of the disaster to alleviate suffering and address near-term emergency needs. National
companies pursued more large-scale, comprehensive disaster relief efforts in which they deployed
heavy machinery and significant numbers of employees to carry out a range of relief activities from
search and rescue (SAR) to debris clearance and the setting up relief camps. In contrast,
multinational companies tended to either carry out field interventions that reflected their technical
expertise or not participate in field operations at all, instead opting to raise monetary donations for
Types of
Intervention
-ab~irieM pf 8f1 6&orate intervenuons in iii
SAR, debris clearance, distribution of relief
materials, food and temporary shelters,
provision of emergency medical services,
transport, relief camps
saptggsponse louowmg tne tyuarat rartnquaKe
-Interventions reflecting core capabilities (IT for
logistics, Communications Network)
-In-kind donations and relief distribution
-Monetary donations to NGOs and Indian
Government
Company Heavy machinery, company employees Employees, technology and technical know-how
Resources deployed in field (engineers, skilled operators, employed in field operations.
Employed management, laborers) , technical knowledge
Government Worked closely with government - regular Worked closely with government - regular
Influence communication; government leaned more communication in field operations.
heavily on national companies for participation
in relief activities
Structure of Unilateral Unilateral (in terms of field activities)
Intervention
Management Directed by employees from regular business Directed by employees from regular business
operations; some committee formation operations; some committee formation (in the
case of field operations)
government and NGO relief funds. These differences in national and multinational companies may
be due to the types of companies interviewed, since national companies were concentrated in
construction and heavier industries as compared to the multinational ones, which were
predominately in service industries. Although relief initiatives were implemented unilaterally in the
field, all corporations noted having a strong working relationship with the government.
The corporations interviewed for this research also played an important role in disaster
recovery, with half of them engaging in rehabilitative initiatives in the disaster-affected communities.
Wny
Recovery?
Have a more "meaningtul impact"
Potential for mitigation & sustainable development
Concern that attention drops off after relief phase
Types of Varied community-level interventions
Intervention Housing reconstruction programs
Mason training and certification modules
Construction of a community hospital
Construction of community center & micro- credit schemes
Structure of Collaborative partnersips
Intervention Partnering mainly with NGOs, also government
Partnership Trusted liaison to community
Rationale NGO expertise in community development
Complementary skills
Local knowledge
Resource constraints - need for personnel to assist in implementation
Partnership Companies:
Roles Exceeded financing role
Activities included: program design, monitoring, lending technical expertise,
provide training, adapting programs, and capturing the learning process
NGOs:
Focused on on-the-ground implementation
Role in information-gathering and identification of beneficiaries
Communicating with and mobilizing community members
Community Community participation considered essential to program success
Desire to target the "most needy "populations within the community
Table 7.2: Summary of the Corporate Disaster Recovery Initiatives following the Gujarat Earthquake
The mix of national and multinational companies that engaged in recovery activities all carried out
their programs as collaborative partnerships with (mostly) NGOs or the government. Thus, to
understand implementation of recovery initiatives, an exploration of these partnerships was
necessary, as summarized in Table 7.2. Whether pursuing housing construction or micro-financing
initiatives, NGOs served as vital liaisons to the target communities. The long-term nature of
recovery efforts made the complementary talents and field deployment of NGO staff essential to the
success of these programs. Unlike the more top-down interventions in community that occurred in
the response, corporate initiatives in recovery attempted to be make community participation a
priority.
The response and recovery activities of both national and multinational corporations in the
case if the Gujarat Earthquake reveals the nuances in the roles and implementation of corporate
initiatives in disasters. For example, the research revealed that only national companies decided to
formalize their disaster efforts as ongoing programs or policies. Because little understanding exists
about the spectrum of private sector activities in response to disasters, uncovering what
corporations are actually doing in the field on a voluntary basis is essential for policy formulation
and the establishment of greater multi-sectoral cooperation and collaboration to tackle growing
disaster vulnerability.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
Using the Gujarat Earthquake of 2001 as a focal point, this research looked at two elements of
corporate participation in disaster response and recovery: motivations for voluntary involvement
and corporate roles and activities. The analysis revealed that corporations are driven to participate
in disaster response and recovery activities for more reasons than were previously identified in the
scholarly and practitioner literatures. Based on this analysis, it appears that the categories of
motivations, which presently are organizational benefits and stakeholder accountability, should be
expanded to include social values, disaster sensitivity, internal organization, external pressures, and
perceived benefits. Each of these dimensions not only serves as key motivations, but as enabling
factors that promote corporate participation in response and recovery. Although motivations were
similar between national and multi-national companies, a major difference that became clear was
that government influence, as a form of external pressure, exercised greater power on national
companies.
The analysis of corporate roles in response suggests that corporations are playing an engaged role,
implementing short-term, unilateral, top-down relief and infrastructure-oriented initiatives in
cooperation with the government. This role seems to be consistent with the emergency needs and
crisis environment that often emerge in the immediate aftermath of a disaster.. Corporate relief
operations tend to leverage the vast internal resources of these organizations. Overall, national
companies appear to play a larger, more comprehensive role in relief activities than multinational
ones, although MNCs are often strategic in their involvement, either drawing on core competencies
for field operations or mobilizing relief funds.
It appears that the recovery efforts of corporations tend to focus on community-level reconstruction
and livelihood-generating programs, implemented through formal, collaborative partnerships with
NGOs. Compared to relief, recovery efforts are more long-term in scope and (relatively) grassroots
in implementation. There were no discernable differences between the approaches and roles of
national and multinational companies in disaster recovery. Within the corporate-NGO partnerships
that emerged, it appears that the organizations play complementary roles, drawing on respective
strengths and skills. A further difference from response is that recovery programs tend to be long-
term and incorporate community participation as a central element. Only national companies
acknowledged their interest and attempts to institutionalize their response or recovery efforts into
formal programs and policies, to create sustainable models and proactively dedicate resources to
address disaster vulnerability.
To some degree the findings from this research affirm the assertions of Twigg (2002) and Bhatt
(2002) about the private sector's activities in disaster contexts. In particular, the emphasis on
altruistic motivations such as humanitarian concern and a tradition of philanthropy were influences
that Twigg (2002 ) pointed to in his global overview of findings on CSR and disaster reduction. Just
as Twigg's study (2002) and the CSR theories propound, leadership from top-level management and
their commitment to a social agenda (disasters in particular) appeared almost universally important
in guiding corporate decisions to take action in response and/or recovery. The relevancy of the
business sector to disasters, as Twigg (2002) suggests, also proved a contributing factor for
participation. A concern for national development impacts given the scale of disaster emerged as a
key motivation for participation, supporting the notion in the CSR literature that companies may be
likely to engage in social actions in times of national crisis.
While affirming some of the existing ideas surrounding corporate participation in disaster response
and recovery and corporate social responsibility, the findings also present new dynamics and aspects
for consideration in this field. CSR theories focus predominately on image-building, publicity,
branding and image as benefits for socially responsible behavior, placing significant emphasis on
these perceived organizational benefits as important drivers of corporate social action. The findings
of this research suggest that CSR, as it is currently projected, misses the temporal aspects and robust
motivations of corporate involvement in disaster response and recovery. In fact, this analysis of the
Gujarat Earthquake suggests that these organizational benefits were viewed as secondary results
arising as spillover effects. While they may have enhanced the overall attractiveness of participating
in disaster response and recovery, they it does not appear that they were the primary factors driving
involvement, particularly since benefits were often not fully understood until after the intervention.
The findings on corporate rationale for disaster intervention also expand existing knowledge of
corporate motivations for disaster participation. Most of the internal organizational factors and
external pressures that emerged as enabling factors for corporate participation in response and
recovery are not addressed in the CSR literature, although some elements reflect concepts
introduced in resource-based theory (Barney 1991; Greening and Gray 1994). As suggested in
resource dependency theory, large organizations can scale and utilize their resources in flexible ways
to respond to social issues (Greening and Gray 1994). Organizational factors emerged as central to
corporate decision-making in the disaster context. Thus, internal factors such as company size,
availability of resources, and employee expectations and external factors such as government
influence, and customer expectations shed new light on the dynamics that promote corporate
participation in disasters.
Several CSR theorists have noted that CSR is not yet a prominent notion in developing countries
and tends to vary significantly with context and culture (Hopkins 2003; Twigg 2002). Therefore,
another finding that challenges the literature is that CSR was a well understood concept among both
multinational and national companies interviewed. Interviewees invoked the term in their
explanations for participating, suggesting that the assumption that CSR is not well-known in
developing countries did not hold true in this case.
As limited research has been conducted on corporate roles in disaster response and recovery, most
of the findings of this research provide new insights into these dynamics. On the response phase,
Twigg reports a willingness among corporations to respond to disasters in the terms of monetary
donations to emergency funds and donations of in-kind relief materials, transport and
communications infrastructure, with efforts being predominately ad-hoc, once-off and short-term.
Indeed, the findings suggest that corporate efforts are ad-hoc and implemented unilaterally, however
it appears that a working relationship and communication with the government during this phase
was essential. The short-term nature of interventions in response is more indicative of the fact that
relief activities are only relevant for some weeks after the disaster impact or event. One thing that
was overlooked in other analyses that came to light in this study was the comprehensiveness and
magnitude of corporate initiatives in disaster response since they scaled and adapted a significant
amount of their resources - employees, technology, machinery, supplies - for deployment in the
field, diverting them from regular business operations. Not only did corporations provide these
resources as "in-kind donations" to victims, but they actually implemented relief activities in the
field utilizing their own company staff.
This research sought to distinguish differences in the response initiatives of national and
multinational companies. The findings suggest that influence from government served as a
motivating factor for national companies. National companies also tended to pursue large-scale,
comprehensive efforts in the relief phase, including the use of heavy machinery. In contrast,
multinational companies either pursued field initiatives that reflected their technical expertise or
focused on donation schemes, although it is possible that this difference is attributable to the
industry types of the companies interviewed. Both national and multinational companies did,
however, rely on their core competencies for response. The trend towards formalization of disaster
programs among national companies suggests that response efforts evolve from being ad-hoc in
nature through standardized policies and programs. This finding implies that national companies
may have a greater inclination to sustain and institutionalize their response efforts in vulnerable
communities.
The findings also provided unique information about the nature of corporate interventions
in disaster recovery as the literature contains limited details about this phase beyond the emerging
trend of formal partnerships with NGOs for implementation. Thus, the findings offer a clearer
picture of how these partnerships are working in practice - the rationale and criteria for partnering
and the respective roles of different actors. Both national and multinational companies viewed the
complementary talents and field deployment of NGO staff as essential to the success of these
programs. The recovery programs reflected a concern for sustainable development, with disaster
vulnerability reduction elements apparent in many of them, linking recovery to proactive mitigation
measures. Corporate initiatives in recovery following the Gujarat Earthquake were less top-down
than response efforts, viewing community participation as vital to the process.
Policy Implications
Since this research only looked at national and multinational corporate responses to one
disaster, the Gujarat Earthquake, it is not possible to generalize the findings to the range of disaster
types and developing country contexts. However, the results of the research are only valuable to the
extent that they can guide policy for more effective disaster response and recovery that addresses
growing disaster vulnerability in developing countries. Hence, flowing from the findings are a
number of policy implications aimed at fostering and supporting a constructive role for corporations
in disaster response and recovery. While specific to the Indian context, they may provide insights
that can be adapted to other situations and countries.
The analysis yields policy recommendations for local and national governments in disaster-
prone developing countries since they are central players in disaster management and are integral to
institution-building in this area. The findings revealed that disasters are unique events that impact
national development from the viewpoint of corporations, and that social values and sensitivity to
disasters, in particular, are promoting their voluntary involvement in response and recovery.
Therefore, a foundation of policy and institutional mechanisms is necessary to foster a constructive
role and increased participation among corporations. The core competencies of corporations should be
considered in the development of policies since corporate expertise and capabilities tended to shape
the nature of interventions for both national and multinational companies.
The differences between the structure of response and recovery initiatives suggest that when
developing disaster management programs, corporations should only be encouraged to pursue
unilateral involvement in disasters if it is in discreet relief activities. Furthermore, national and local
governments may benefit if they pursue policies that foster an enabling environment for corporate -
NGO partnerships in disaster recovery. This can be accomplished through the creation of incentives,
simplified procedures and formal programs for partnerships. Governments might also consider
carrying out needs assessments in disaster-affected areas and facilitating field communication during
disasters to ensure that corporate resources are being directed to the appropriate areas. Although
policies should encourage corporate involvement in disasters, parallel regulations may prove
necessary to ensure that corporate interventions are carried out in a proper, ethical way.
Since the corporations that participated in this study highlighted the steep learning curve
associated with involvement in response and recovery, government decision-makers might consider
developing disaster guidelines or a handbook for corporate involvement to help overcome the
obstacles to participation. They should also consider aligning with proactive companies to encourage
them to act as liaisons within their industries. This may facilitate peer learning and build positive
influence/pressure for involvement. National governments should aim to create country-level,
broad-based disaster organizations or institutions to serve as forums to share best practices in
disaster management. Given the increasing interest in multi-sectoral models, such an institution
could serve as a vehicle for building relationships across sectors, including government agencies,
educational institutions, civil society organizations, humanitarian NGOs, international organizations
and private companies. Formation of this type of national institution is key because open dialogue
among different actors, both before and after disasters, appears necessary to build the foundations
for true multi-sectoral collaboration in disaster management.
The research findings also have relevance for the operations and activities of intermediary
organizations (or business-member NGOs), such as the Disaster Resource Network (DRN), which
aim to mobilize private sector assets- technology, materials, and expertise - to meet the needs of
government and relief organizations engaged in disaster management. The findings suggest that the
pledging and matching of corporate resources is suitable for the response phase, while facilitating
the creation of corporate-NGO partnerships would be more appropriate for recovery work. Also,
the analysis implies that there may be potential to encourage more direct action by corporations
during the response phase as part of a coordinated response. These intermediary organizations
might also consider playing a supervisory role in terms of oversight of corporate disaster operations
to ensure that standards are met, building the reputation of corporations as trustworthy disaster
actors.
The risk to corporations, particularly with respect to liabilities that can arise in disaster
operations involving corporate personnel and equipment has been perceived as a major obstacle for
corporate participation in intermediate organizations focused on disasters. Risk, however, did not
appear to be central concern to the companies interviewed for this research. It may have emerged as
a greater factor if the companies interviewed were deploying their resources from sources outside
the country. This finding, plus the tendency for national companies to formalize their efforts,
suggests country-level models for the DRN and similar organizations are likely to be the most
successful. Furthermore, country-level and regional structures for these organizations seem logical
based on the prominence of corporate motivations related to national concerns and local
community. This model also presents an opportunity to build greater local capacity. Furthermore,
considering the bifurcation of disaster approaches between national and multinational companies,
these organizations might consider engaging national and multinational companies on different
terms.
Similar to the government, intermediary organizations should consider internalizing and
addressing some of the obstacles to corporate involvement in order to reduce the learning curve for
companies through formal training and peer-to-peer exchanges. Since corporate interventions in
disaster response and recovery are generally shaped by the evaluation of past experience in disasters,
organizations like the DRN should facilitate the establishment of best practices for corporations in
response and recovery. These organizations can also serve as a vehicle for stimulating
communication between companies involved in disaster initiatives, which does not happen when
efforts are isolated. For example, the five companies in India looking to formalize their disaster
programs were not collaborating or aware of each other's plan to institutionalize their programs.
Lastly, since there is limited assessment of the impact of corporate involvement, these intermediary
business organizations should consider developing indicators and measures for the evaluation of
corporate interventions.
Next Steps
Although the research findings provide new insights, which help inform policy approaches,
they only reveal part of the picture of corporate behavior in the context of disasters. The limitations
of the research design and approach suggest further areas for action. The research focused on what
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may be deemed 'exemplary cases', interviewing corporations which had active CSR programs and
believed their involvement following the Gujarat Earthquake was successful. The research did not
investigate those corporations involved in disaster activities in Gujarat which were criticized for
failing to live up to social expectations of their stated role and for primarily seeking publicity from
their activities. Research on these failed corporate attempts is also necessary. Were their motivations
the same? What types of activities did they carry out and in what manner? An understanding of less
successful or more negatively received initiatives is imperative in order to understand and mitigate
for potential obstacles to corporate involvement in response and recovery.
The research also relied on company accounts of their own activities, omitting the valuable
perspectives of beneficiaries and other disaster actors affected by corporate involvement in response
and recovery. Overall, corporations were positive about their approaches and contribution but
whether this sentiment is shared by other stakeholders remains unknown. How do other disaster
actors perceive corporate involvement? Did corporations meet their stated goals from the point of
view of the affected communities? What are the reflections of the NGO partners of corporations in
recovery? Understanding how corporate interventions in the Gujarat Earthquake were perceived by
other stakeholders allows for a broader interpretation of private sector efforts in response and
recovery, illuminating the strengths and shortcomings of their involvement.
Several questions about corporate involvement in disasters in different countries and
contexts still remain. The analysis of the Gujarat earthquake only provides a perspective on
corporate efforts in response to one disaster in one developing country context. Therefore, some of
the findings are likely to be either earthquake or India specific. To allow for the ability to generalize
the findings to other contexts, more research needs to be done on private sector involvement in
different types of disasters in other disaster-prone developing countries. Further research would
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allow for comparison to the Gujarat Earthquake case in order to determine overall trends and
themes in corporate involvement in disaster response and recovery.
Conclusion
Disaster vulnerability is a serious issue in developing countries where globalization,
development patterns, poverty and environmental degradation are placing more people at risk to
natural disasters. This rising vulnerability in developing countries is occurring as natural disasters in
general are increasing frequency and intensity. Mitigation and disaster reduction policies have
emerged as the predominant approach to dealing with disaster vulnerability. However, disaster
response and recovery also provide important avenues for intervention in high vulnerability
communities. Recent appeals for greater multi-sectoral collaboration to tackle complex disaster
situations have raised the need for private sector participation in disaster management. The fact that
corporate expansion and globalization have created forces that indirectly impact disaster
vulnerability in developing countries further suggests corporate engagement in disaster response and
recovery may be a matter of social responsibility. The private sector is already beginning to play
more engaged roles in disaster response and recovery on philanthropic terms, yet limited
understanding currently exists about corporate motivations and the actual roles they are playing in
response and recovery.
This examination of national and multi-national corporate responses to the Gujarat
Earthquake in 2001 explored corporate motivations and their roles in response and recovery. In
regards to motivations, several factors appeared to be important including: social values, disaster
sensitivity, internal organization, external pressures, and perceived benefits drove companies to
participate in disaster situations. These dimensions expand our prior understanding of corporate
motivations which focused primarily on organizational benefits and stakeholder expectations. In
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terms of disaster response, companies pursued unilateral disaster relief activities, often implementing
large-scale, top-down relief and infrastructure-oriented initiatives that leverage the internal resources
of these companies. Collaborative partnerships, as the aspired new paradigm in disaster
management, are emerging as the structure of corporate recovery programs, wherein the talents and
resources of both corporations and NGOs are being utilized in community-oriented reconstruction
and livelihood generation programs. The findings suggest that corporations can play a constructive
role in response and recovery that complements the efforts of existing actors as they work to reduce
suffering and increase the resiliency of vulnerable communities affected by disasters. Paramount to
achieving effective private sector collaboration in response and recovery is the development of
policies that encourage corporate participation in disasters while maintaining high expectations and
standards for corporate initiatives in the field.
Corporate participation in disaster response and recovery is an important dimension and
near-term goal for dealing with disaster vulnerability in developing countries. In the long-run,
however, companies will also need to think systematically about how their products, operations and
policies impact disaster vulnerability in indirect and direct ways and strive to have mitigation goals
integrated into business operations. Only by both internalizing mitigation policies and dedicating
resources to response and recovery initiatives will companies in disaster-prone areas achieve
comprehensive social responsibility in the disaster context.
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Appendix A: Acronym List
Acronyms Explained
HVC High Vulnerability Community
IFRC International Federation of the Red Cross and Crescent Societies
UNDAC The United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility
MNC Multinational Corporation
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Appendix B: Interview Questions
Semi-Structured Interview Questions
1. Please describe what activities the company carried out in response to the Gujarat
Earthquake of January 2001.
a. What role did the company play?
b. Was the relief effort part of an existing system or program within the company?
c. Is this the only natural disaster in which the company has participated?
d. Were company employees involved? In what way? What other company resources
(materials, technology, expertise, etc.) were employed for the effort?
e. What were the goals of the project? The timeline? What have been the results of the
project thus far? Were the stated goals achieved?
f. Was the project completed, aborted or ongoing?
2. Who within your organization was involved in the decision-making that determined the
company's involvement? At what level was the decision to participate made?
3. Who were the beneficiaries of your project?
4. How would you describe the company's responsibility to the beneficiaries as stakeholders?
How does the company define corporate social responsibility?
5. How did you determine which beneficiaries to target and the nature of the effort?
6. Why was this an important group for the company to target?
7. Did the company partner with an NGO, government agency or other organizations? If so,
how was cooperation initiated? What was the nature of the arrangement? What were the
strengths and weaknesses of such an alliance?
8. What other disaster relief actors (government, NGOS, army, etc.) did you encounter or
coordinate with and what was the nature of the interaction?
9. Did your relief activities augment existing activities or did it fill an unmet niche? How?
10. Was the company's business, its facilities or employees affected by the Gujarat earthquake?
How?
11. Does the company have offices or operations within the impact area?
12. Did the type of response pursued reflect the company's core capabilities?
13. On what terms did your company participate (voluntary, commercial, etc.)?
14. What were the company's guiding principles for involvement?
15. Would the company be likely to participate in another disaster? Have you created or
formalized any programs to handle future disasters?
16. What division of the company handled the disaster relief effort?
17. What was the company's primary reason for participating in disaster response? Secondary
reasons?
18. What did the company hope to gain from its participation in disaster response?
19. What does the company perceive as the benefits and costs of participation in disaster response?
20. What relationship, if any, do you think your disaster relief participation has to each of the
following: 1) Employees, 2) Investors, 3) Customers, 4) Community, 5) Reputation, 6)
Image, 7) Bottom line 8) Sustainable Development?
21. How was the company's involvement in disaster relief publicized?
22. Why did the company get involved in disasters in particular over other areas of aid or
development?
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23. What is the company's vision (does it have a clearly articulated vision statement)? Does this
viewpoint permeate the organization or is high- level management driving it?
24. How would you define the broader community in which the company operates? What
relationship does the company have with its community?
25. Does the company have other social programs that it pursues? Do they relate to its work in
disaster response? If so, how?
26. Does the company have a code of conduct? What other socially responsible practices and
procedures does the company follow?
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Appendix C: World Social Forum - Critique of Corporations as Disaster Actors
Gujarat Exhibit at the World Social Forum, Mumbai, India, January 2004
The poster display criticized corporate interventions following the Gujarat Earthquake, noting that
"the corporate world did not live up to this (community) expectation."
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Appendix D: Detailed Lists of Company Resources Deployed in Response Phase
IFFCO and Hindustan Construction Company(HCC) supplied the following details about their
resource deployment in the response phase to the Gujarat Earthquake. Their efforts are illustrative
of the massive relief initiatives that some national companies pursued.
IFFCO
Soon after the earthquake, wasting no time, IFFCO's men and
machinery were deployed from day one, for massive relief and rescue
operations as under:
Removal of debris
* Providing pay-loaders, trucks, forklifts, gas-cutting machines,
buses and ambulance
* Rescuing possible survivors
* Treating the injured
* Providing basic needs of food, water, clothes, and shelter through
a relief camp
* Providing round-the-clock free medical service
* Coordinating with civic authorities for providing services, for
distribution of relief material received from abroad and other
places
* Supplying medicines, drinking water and other material to
Hospitals and dispensaries at various places
* Supply of drinking water through tankers to affected areas
* Distribution of masks
Hindustan Construction Company
The company resources deployed for the efforts as follows:
Manpower:
The groups were formed consisting of operators, mechanics,
engineers (Civil & Mechanical), a Doctor, a Compounder, and a
Personnel Officer under the leadership of the Project Mechanical
Engineer. HCC was the first company to reach the affected location
with equipment. After getting the feedback from the first batch, we
improvised our services / help / communication etc., considering the
grassroots-level problems at the location.
Equipment:
The following equipments were deployed:
1 No. JCB
1 No. Hitachi Excavator
1 No. Water Tanker (10000 ltr capacity)
2 Nos. Gas Cutting Sets
1 No. Tata Truck
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2 Nos. Mobile Lighting Towers
1 No. Crane (Capacity of 40 T)
Expertise:
Highly skilled crew for operation of equipment & machinery under
the leadership of PME along with Civil Engineers were deployed ... for
couple of months.
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